Thailand: Fight against Corruption
by Prof. Nualnoi Treerat1
I. Introduction. Corruption has been the serious problem in Thailand for many years. It has been widespread, deeply rooted, well-organized and tolerated. However, during the past five years, there was a clear attempt to fight against corruption. The paper aims to examine changes in environment through the political reform to combat corruption, review perception and experience of private sector on the issue of corruption in the public sector, and analyze the role and impact of social movement on the fight against corruption. II. Political Reform An attempt to reform the politics through the constitutional movement has occurred clearly since 1991. In the past, there were 15 constitutions in Thailand during 1932-1997. The draft of present constitution has passed by the parliament in October 1997. There are several key challenges to the new constitution. 2.1 New Constitution. The new version of constitution was called ¡°people's charter¡± because this is the first constitution that people could participate during the process of drafting. This made the 16th constitution completely different from the previous constitutions, which most Thai constitutions have been drafted by those close to the military juntas. The new constitution concerns the essence of the so-called 'social contract" between the state and the people. In 1996 a Constitution Drafting Assembly, consisting 99 members, was formed, one member was elected in each province, totally 76 members. Another 33 members were appointed from politicians and academics. Essential substance of the new charter lies in the promotion and protection of rights and liberties of the people, provision of public participation in the governance and inspecting the exercise of State power as well as improving a political structure to achieve more efficiency and stability. This provides new instruments for people to get control over the state. The Constitutional Drafting Assembly took nearly 1 year to draft and to conduct the public hearing all around the country. It has been argued that the process of consultation with the public through the Constitution drafting was at least as important as the resulting document. Because the process of making the new constitution encourages people to participate to determine and protect their rights and liberties. In addition, the movement increase people's knowledge on the constitution, therefore, the constitution is not only the law that had been employed by the Parliament like in the past, but also the people can make use of the law too. As noted in the statement of the former Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand on August 27, 1997: "This is the first time in the 65-year history of Thailand's democracy that the draft is being drawn up, not by the elite, not by the people in power, but it's being drawn up by layman... such a diverse group...such different conceptions and background¡±2 The new constitution creates the new way to `checks and balances the system'. This is achieved through a decentralisation of power from the central government to independent institutions of state. This, in turn, creates significant opportunities for public participation. It strengthens people's power in getting control over the state. These new independent institutions are:
These independent organisations have been founded to place these bodies beyond the control or influence of politicians or political parties. The nomination of members of the bodies will be made by neutral and well qualified selection committee and forwarded to the Senate for approval. This system allows to monitor the State's power. Said Anand Punyarachun: "In the past, politicians could sin, commit wrong-doings, and they would go scot-free. We introduced a system of monitoring, a system of impeachment. We strengthened all the existing institutions and we created new ones, to make them more independent - not subservient to the government, but responsible to the Parliament.....We have converted the Senate from a rather ineffective law-making body, into a monitoring institution. Senators will not have the power to initiate legislation...but they will have much more power to monitor the performance of the government and the performance of the elected members of the House of Representaives."3 The Constitution also increases civil rights and civil liberties through the introduction of people's participation. There are several measures that allow people to have direct participation to the process of decision making of the State. In the past, the participation of people has only done through the election of the representative. These measures include:
After the May 1992 incident, the public demanded for radio and television reform. This was a result of the struggle of reliable information during the protest against the unelected Prime Minister in May 1992. On the other hand, the print media that had been more freedom has earned a greater degree of people's acceptance from its defiant role during the crisis to function as a more reliable social `mirror' and has become a more independent channel for two-way communication. The government has begun to release the control over the media since the May 1992. The media reform is expected to increase the role of the media in policy advocacy. Thailand's first independent television channel began transmission on 1 July 1996. In addition, the new Constitution also promotes the decentralisation policy. The Constitution focuses clearly on control and monitoring on the local administration by the local people. Empowerment of the people can be done through several measures, including:6
2.2 Vote buying and dirty politics. Money politics was argued to be the main root of corruption in Thailand. Under the new Constitution, the electoral system has aimed to reduce money politics, particularly vote-buying and the seeking of cabinet positions through money. The Secretary of the Constitution Drafting Assembly's drafting committee, Borwornsak Uwanno said during the period of drafting that "We have to know why politicians invest in elections...Thai law is not like American Law, which has details that constrain the discretion of officials. But under Thai laws, full discretion has been given to cabinet ministers. So, that is the main cause of corruption. Politicians foresee that if they invest, for example, only 30 million baht in an election, they can get back more, even one billion baht (through investment). So they invest."7 The constitution attempts to combat vote buying through stronger monitoring and through the newly-instituted powers of the Election Commission to pronounce immediately on election fraud. Although, we know that the vote-buying will result in unqualified politician gaining seat in the House of Representatives and thus the cabinet, the issues of vote-buying are complex because they tie to rural poverty, the patronage system, and the feudal attitudes. The vote-buying creates the so-called `political paradox' in Thailand. The issue of the political paradox in Thailand is that a democratic system allows the rural majority to choose the government while the middle class who has less influenced on the composition of the house and cabinet, has more power to form an alliance to oust an elected government. Therefore, those who put the government into and those who end its life are not the same people. Moreover, these groups hold incompatible views of democracy. For rural people, democracy is a mean to bring greater benefits and official attention to themselves and their villages. Voting in rural areas is not guided by political principles, policy issues, or what is perceived as the national interests mentioned above. Besides, voting decisions in rural Thailand have been conditioned initially by the relationships between patrons and clients. But for educated middle class, democracy is a form of legitimate rule to recruit honest and capable persons, of course, this is the western concept of democracy. Often, the government in favor of the middle class, has been named as `the government for the rich not for the poor'. The political dilemma is, indeed, the mirror of the economic dilemma in Thai society. This leads to an increase in difficulty to reform the state as political stability is needed under the process of the reform. Although the middle class has always voiced for more freedom and more democratic, they have never learnt how to solve the real problem of political paradox. The middle class should understand that democracy cannot survive as long as the huge socioeconomic gap between urban and rural areas or between the rich and the poor persists. In sum, in the march towards political reform through the Thai Constitution reform, it has increased not only the degree of democratization, but also the degree of decentralization as well as the degree of participation of people on a democratic process. This gives right to more equitable distribution of political as well as economic power among the people. 2.3 Information Act. Although it has been stated clearly in the constitution about the ¡°right to know¡±, the movement to receive such right has begun since 1991. The information act was approved by the Parliament one month ahead of the 1997 constitution. The law has been contributed to democratic administration in the following aspects8: According to the Official Information Act (OIA), information and state agency have been defined as follows: ¡°information means a material which communicates matters, facts data or anything, whether such communication is made by the nature of such material itself or through any means whatsoever and whether it is arrange in a form of a document, file, book, diagramme, map, drawing, photograph, film, visual or sound recording, or recording by a computer or any other method which can be displayed; official information means an information in possession or control of a State agency, whether it is the information relating to the operation of the State or the information relating to a private individual; State agency means a central administration, provincial administration, local administration, State enterprise, Government agency attached to the National Assembly, Court only in respect of the affair unassociated with the trial and adjudication of cases, professional supervisory organisation, independent agency of the State and such other agency as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation; (OIA, 2540: section 4). The main purposes of the OIA are transparency, public participation accountability and fairness.
Until August 2000, the 368 cases have been appealed. Most of the case concentrated in the group of society, public administration and law enforcement. Approximately 90 per cent of the appeal cases were desired to open up the information. However, it was taken 4-5 months on average for the process. 2.4 National Counter Corruption Commission Thailand has had a Counter Corruption Commission since the early 1970s. However, with limited investigatory authority, no prosecutorial power, and under supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister, the CCC had been named as `paper tiger'. It has never succeeded with `big fish' case. Most of their works contributed to investigate the problems of bureaucrats' petty corruption. However, under the 1997 Constitution, the organization has been reformed and empowered. The organization is independent from the elected politician and the cabinet. Commissioners were appointed by the Senate. Scrutiny of politicians and officials by the NCCC can be initiated through one of four channels to obtain legal proof of corrupt behavior and unaccounted-for wealth:9 "1. A motion by the opposition for a no-confidence debate against the prime minister and cabinet members for corrupt behavior or unaccounted-for wealth which automatically requires an NCCC investigation.
In addition, the 1997 Constitution determines the anti-corruption measures to monitor the use of power of the politician. They include10
III. Perception and experiences of business sector and household 3.1 Business sector Faculty of Economics, Thai Chamber of Commerce University conducted the business environment and governance survey11, aiming mainly to find constrains to business development, as well as the quality of public governance and services relating to corruption. The results of the survey, especially connecting to the perception and experience of business sector on corruption in the public sector, are summarized as follows:
Table 1: Time spent in dealing with government officials
Paying additional payments to government officials to get things done also gives consequential effect. That is when a firm pays additional payment to a particular government official, another government official will subsequently require an additional payment for the same service. This is "always, mostly and frequently" true for 67 per cent of the firms. Besides, when a government agent acts against the rules, only 13 per cent said that they could always and mostly go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial payments. However, 39 per cent said that they never and seldom could. When additional payments are required, more than half of the firm (52%) said that it is known beforehand how to pay and how much to pay. In some cases, the government agent indicates or asks for a payment (25%). However, 23 per cent admitted that the enterprise also offer a payment. Therefore, the "additional payment" is regarded as being "common and customary". Table 2: Firms responded about "additional payment"
However, the amounts of extra payments vary, depending on the size and sector of firm. For small firms, the largest amount is paid to government procurement agents, followed by tax agency/inspectors and electricity power agents. For medium firms, the largest amount is paid to customs agents, followed by government procurement agents and tax agency/inspectors. Finally for large firms, the largest amount is paid to trade licensing and customs agents, followed by tax agency/inspectors and electricity power agents. The sector of business that seems to bear the highest payments is construction followed by manufacturing, agriculture and commerce. The sectors of manufacturing and services pay the largest amount to customs officials, while the sectors of commerce and construction pay the largest amounts to government procurement. Agricultural sector pays the largest amount to electricity services. For all sectors tax agents/inspectors come in the second place.
Table 3: Number of contacts, frequency and amount of extra payment.
Table 4: Share of unofficial payment in firm's revenues (per cent)
Source: Thailand Business Environment and Governance Survey
Table 5: Firms' willingness to pay to eliminate problems (per cent)
Source: Thailand Business Environment and Governance Survey
3.2 Perception and Experience of Households The national survey on perception and experience of household on corruption in the public sector was conducted during October-December 199912. The results show that:
Table 6: Amount willing to pay to eliminate national problem perceived as most serious.
To eliminate the corruption in public sector, households, who identified corruption in the public sector as the worst problem, will pay 4.5 per cent of their annual income or 9,275 baht, yielding a national total of 5 billion baht (fifty times of the budget allocate to the NCCC in fiscal year 2001). However, when all households were asked directly what they would pay to eliminate corruption, one third would pay. Each is willing to pay 3.3 per cent of annual household income or 5,088 baht, yielding a national total of 26 billion, equivalent to almost 3 per cent of the 2001 government's budget.
The average bribe solicited is highest at the police 9,588 baht, followed by the customs (8,428 baht), tax offices (6,287) and land offices (3,179 baht). Bribes solicited from offices supplying are significantly lower. As total amount of bribes solicited depend on frequency of visiting the office, the highest total amount of bribes solicited over the past year is at the land offices (5.1 billion baht), followed by the police at 4.8 billion and the tax offices at 3.5 billion. The amount of bribes solicited last year at the land offices, police and tax offices account for 34 per cent, 31 per cent and 23 per cent of the total amount bribes solicited respectively. The three offices account for approximately 87 per cent of the total amount of 15.4 billion solicited in bribes by the public offices in the survey (Table 7). The driving/auto offices, customs, district and government schools each account for over 100 million baht in bribes solicited each year. However, the amount solicited by public services including electricity, water supply, public telephone postal, public hospital and trash collection are minimal. Table 7: Services rating, complaints, and bribe solicitation by offices
Besides, the frequency of soliciting bribes by the government offices is adversely related to the quality of the services provided by the government offices. For example, the customs, police and land offices have the highest frequency of soliciting bribes and the lowest ratings for service quality (Table 7). On average, every household is solicited bribes of 970 baht per year from various offices. Approximately 10 per cent of all households were solicited for bribe over the past year. Among those households that were solicited, each pay almost 10,000 baht for bribe solicitation, mostly at the police, customs, tax and land offices. In short, bribe solicitation is not the major factor in the delivery of normal household services, such as electricity supply, water supply, post offices and public telephone. In general, households satisfy with these services with a few exceptions. Bribe solicitation is a major factor in any government office involved with transactions concerning money or property.
Generally people are relatively certain that payment will increase the chance that a problem with an official would be resolved speedily and effectively. On a 7 point scale, the mean was 4.7 for all households who answered this question. The mean increased to 5.4 for all households who were solicited for bribe. Table 8: Method of bribing
Those who had been asked for the bribes over the court case were uncertain whether payment made the outcome more certain. Forty-three per cent felt bribe did make the outcome more certain, but 33 per cent disagree and 24 per cent were neutral. Table 9: Corruption in the judicial system
Table 10: Vote-buying offered at the last elections
At the last general election, the average amount offered per household was 678 baht. The amount offered was significantly higher in Bangkok area (1,142 baht) than in the rural area (554 baht). The total amount involved nationwide was around 3 billion baht, with around half offered in the rural area. For local elections, although the proportion of households offered money is less than in the general elections, the amounts tend to be higher. The average per household is in the range of 700 - 1,000 baht. In sum, the total amount offered in all elections amounted to 4.7 billion baht.
For the mechanism to report the cases of corruption, only thirty per cent of households know how to report. Of these, 61 per cent believe it should be reported to the Counter Corruption Commission, and 57 per cent to the police (Table 11). Generally households are not sure about the effectiveness of corruption reporting process, but for those who know how to report a case of corruption are slightly more confident about the effectiveness. However, about 20 per cent of respondents had witnessed a case of corruption. Of those witnessed, only 5 per cent reported the case. Fifty-six per cent of witnessed a case thought, but did not report. Thirty-nine per cent of witness did not think to report. The main reasons for `not report a case' are fear of reprisals and doubt that anyone will be punished. Table 11: Combating corruption
Pasuk Phongpsichit et al. (2000) state the conclusion from their study as follows: "On the evidence of this survey, Thailand is not badly afflicted by the sort of low-level corruption characterised by the petty payments solicited regularly from ordinary people for the pursuit of normal public services. There is some of this, but not much. Despite frequent contact with government offices, 90 per cent of households claim not to be affected and a further 6 per cent are solicited for rather small sums (less than 1,000 baht annually). IV. Social Movement against Corruption To fight against, especially in the country with weak law enforcement, civil or social movement plays an important role. The case of making the 1997 Constitution in Thailand is a good example of social movement. The 1997 Constitution is totally different from other Constitutions that had been adopted in Thailand. One of the main essences of the new constitution is to monitor the use of power relating to corruption. To understand the role of social movement under the 1997 Constitution, the case of Public Health's drug procurement scandal is discussed. On June 15, 1998 the chairperson of the Rural Doctor Society (RDS) sent letters to the association members warning them to be watchful of the public health ministry's allocation of budget for welfare services to the low-income people, which appeared to be dubious. This information was published in the newspaper. From then on, an influx of information on the corruption issue in the public health ministry started to come out continuously for several months.
According to an interview of one of the television broadcaster, the director of a provincial hospital has mentioned that:
"Two months ago I was told by the provincial health chief that this year the hospital would get a 1 million baht budget for drug purchases, a substantial increase from the initial amount of 600,000 baht. But I was also told that we had to place orders with companies named by the senior persons in the Public Health Ministry, for example the Siam green Cross Supply" (Nation, 2/9/98). In the purchase process, doctors who were approached were not informed about exact price of drug and medical equipment. They were told that the provincial administration was also informed of the prices, which turned out to be two or three times higher than what they were supposed to be. For example, a glove which should have cost 110 baht was sold at 220 baht, and a syring cost 160 baht instead of 80 baht. The Rural Doctor Society called on district hospital directors nationwide not to accept the budget provided for purchasing drugs and medical supplies and return the money to government coffers after learning that the budget has been abused. The society also urged doctors to send it irregular purchasing documents for submission to the Counter Corruption Commission (CCC) and the office of the Auditor-General for investigation. The society's decision came after a series of complaints from several hospitals that the 1.4 billion baht allocated by the Rural Health Division (RHD) and the Provincial Hospitals Division, had been abused. According to the complaints, The district hospital were told to buy products from specific companies with the ¡°price list¡±, quoting products at prices two or three times higher than normal (Nation 15/8/1998). Public Health Minister insisted that there were no irregularities concerning the use of this budget and also refused to set up a committee to investigate the case as demanded by the society because he did not want to be blamed for prosecuting the permanent officials. However, a group of 67 Thammasat University lecturers signed on an open letter calling for an independent investigation into the medical supplies scandal. An independent committee led by the retired senior public health official was appointed to find out what was going on in September 1998. At the same time, the Permanent Secretary has spoken that the movement of the RDS caused by the loss of 10 per cent commission fee from drug and medical supplies purchases. This led to a protest by the RDS members and the medium to high ranking public health officials. In September 1998, about 30 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stepped up the pressure on the government over the public health ministry's alleged drug scandal, calling for the resignation of the minister, his two deputies and other top health officials, including permanent secretary. The group announced they would gather the 50,000 signatures necessary to request a Senate dismissal of the minister if they refused to resign within a week. The NGOs also called on the government to protect the doctors and pharmacists who had already made the purchases at inflated prices and to spare them as witness so they would not become scapegoats. With the pressure from the public, Public Health Minister, finally, resigned from the post while his deputy from the same party refused to do so. The media, including televisions, radios and newspapers were opened up the corruption in several public hospitals. The case showed the similar story that the senior officials have ordered the public hospitals to buy medicines and medical supplies from some companies with the high prices. In the late September, The fact-finding committee concluded that certain politicians had collaborated with top permanent officials to force state hospitals to abuse the 1.4 billion baht budget for purchasing medicines and medical equipment. The investigation report was sent to the Prime Minister, who forwarded it to the Counter Corruption Commission. Then the government set up a disciplinary committee to investigate implicated officials. The Permanent Secretary was transferred out of the Ministry and never returned. NGOs had collected the some of fifty thousand signatures, according to the new constitution, and demanded to investigate the politicians and senior permanent officials. This was the first case after the new constitution came into effect. Since then there have been several cases practicing the new constitution of public participation. NGOs and media also made use of Information Acts to request the investigating report from the government and continue the issue if there was an attempt to protect the officials and politician involved in the corruption. Although, currently, the investigating result cannot link to the top officials both politicians and permanent bureaucrat, this might be the first case that the people organised the movement against corruption in Thai society.
References: Faculty of Economics, The University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce. Thailand: Business Environment and Governance Survey (TBEGS). 2000. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Nualnoi Treerat, Yongyuth Chaiyapong and Chris Baker. 2000. Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand: Perception and Experience of Households. Political Economy Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. Thai Development Newsletter, No. 36 January-June 1999:22. Footnotes 1. Director of Political Economy Study Center, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University 2. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore. 3. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore. 4. Articles 58-59, Constitution of Thailand, 1997. 5. Articles 39-41, Constitution of Thailand, 1997. 6. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore. 7. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore, pp. 170-171. 8. Thai Development Newsletter, No. 36 January-June 1999:22. 9. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore, pp. 169. 10. John Laird. 2000. Money Politics, Globalisation and Crisis: The Case of Thailand Graham Brash Pte Ltd. Singapore, pp. 169-170. 11. Faculty of Economics, The University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce. Thailand: Business Environment and Governance Survey (TBEGS). 2000. The project was financed by the World Bank and is an integral part of the Worldwide Business Environment Survey undertaken by the World Bank through most of its member countries. The Business Environment and Government Survey in the case of Thailand was conducted during the second half of 1999 with the sample sizes of 422 throughout the country. 12. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Nualnoi Treerat, Yongyuth Chaiyapong and Chris Baker. 2000. Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand: Perception and Experience of Households. Political Economy Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. The survey includes 4,016 household head. The sample was selected using multi-stage cluster sampling, and the results have been weighted to estimate the total population of 15.9 million Thai households. 13. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Nualnoi Treerat, Yongyuth Chaiyapong and Chris Baker. 2000. Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand: Perception and Experience of Households. Political Economy Center, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. Pages 57-58. |
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