China and the Korean Peace Process

Session IV: The Role of China: Views from Korea and Europe

China and the Korean Peace Process

by Choon Heum Choi

Introduction

Last year of 2000 we witnessed tremendous changes in political moods on the Korean peninsula. It was largely due to the result of the historical summit meeting between the two Koreas. In fact, it was a momentum since the Korean War of 1950. This inter-Korean Summit meeting was a product resulted from the South Korea's proposals when she has initiated a drive for constructing a peace structure on the Peninsula in 1999.¹⁾

Recently, the US President Bush changed its strategic postures toward China from the "strategic partnership" to "competitive relationship." To the US, the term of "competitive relationship" has the meaning of neither enemy nor friend. Thus, the Sino-US relations will be strained and thorny in the years ahead. In addition, the Bush administration criticized the Clinton administration's North Korean policies and he demanded the previous US-South Korea's approaches toward North Korea be more verifiable. However, South Korea wants to continue the current engagement policies toward the North without any revisions. There will be some kinds of disagreements and conflicts of interests dealing with the North between the US and South Korea.

Under above circumstances, it is important to know how China will deal with the issues concerning the Korean peace process. This paper will examine and analyze the China's Korean policies and issues relating to the Korean peace process. Issues relating to the Korean peace process can be identified as followings at least: North Korea's nuclear and missile development, dissolution of United Nations Command (UNC), Peace Agreement, status of United States Forces in Korea (USFK).

II. China's Perception of Northeast Asian Security Environment

Even though China has continued to emphasize its desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, however, Beijing's postures and emphasis on various issues relating to the establishment of a peace structure have been somewhat different from those of South Korea and the United States. China's Korean policies has been changed in part not only by the China's perceived current security environment in the Northeast Asia,²⁾ but also by the issues-areas. I will elaborate how China perceives her recent changes in the security environment and then analyze how it will influence its Korean policies in general.

In short, China judges the current security environment has begun to change from bad one to worse one. From Beijing's view, first, this was largely due to the Bush administration's hegemonic approach to China. Second, surrounding countries are eager to get more advanced weapons thereby increasing arms race in this region. Third, difficulties in US-North Korea's normalization process ahead because of a thorny issue of North Korea's nuclear and missile development.

1. American Hegemonism and Strengthening Its Alliance Policy

Recently China has worried that its established strategic partnership with the US has changed rapidly to the competitive one. China perceives that the US will threat its defense posture seriously and directly. China asserts that this was largely due to American hegemonic intervention and enhancing of its alliance ties with Japan. China's blames are the followings: The NATO army led by the US intervened in the Yugoslavia without regard to UN Security Council's resolution was an example of the US hegemonism which has brought about new developments in the sectors of international politics, security, and economics. In addition, China blames that in Asia, through the strengthening of the military alliance with Japan and the ROK, the US is making an attempt to achieve control of the Asia-Pacific region."³⁾

2. US Missile Defense Program

China judges that the United States is speeding up the research and development of the Missile Defense (MD) by taking advantage of its multinational corporations' technological superiority. Japan already announced joining of the MD program financing technological research on missile development. As a result, China perceived that the MD program has already sparked an arms race in Asian region.

China's top concern has been that the MD program eventually would include and rearm Taiwan with highly advanced anti-missile defense capabilities.⁴⁾ In that case, the Chinese threat against Taiwan which China had already dispatched more than 200 missiles near the Taiwan Straits could be frustrated.⁵⁾

In response, China has accelerated its military spendings. According to some experts, "a ten-fold increase in Chinese ICBM force may be inevitable" if the US decides to deploy MD.⁶⁾ Since October 1999 China already renewed suspended tests of nuclear weapons and confirmed around $9.7 billion funding to enhance its second strike capabilities of its strategic missiles.⁷⁾

China judges that seeking strong strategic cooperations with Russia to prevent American MD program from going further will be, in fact, very difficult tasks. China thought that even though Russia firmly rejected the US demand of revision of ABM treaty, Russia will not perceive that around twenty of the American anti-missiles' threats against Russian ICBMs might not endanger her offensive capability seriously.⁸⁾

3. Growing Strains Between North Korea and the US

Recently, China judged that the US rather than the North Korea has been more responsible for making the US - North Korean relations strained. China and the North denounced the MD program is the major factor to make the peace and stability in the Northeast Asia unstable and dangerous. From the China's judgement, this one will be another factor which makes this region unstable further.

When the Bush administration asserts that it will need to reexamine its North Korean policy,⁹⁾ China perceives that the US move was aimed to strengthen its cause of stationing the USFK.¹⁰⁾ China concludes that due to the Bush administration's so-called 'verification policy' and reversal of terrorism toward the North, the US -North Korean relations will be strained in the meantime.

During the Clinton administration, even though Beijing and Pyongyang stressed that the North and China opposed hegemonism and power politics, they did not specifically pinpoint American hegemonism.¹¹⁾At that time, neither China nor the North did want to discourage the American will to solve the missile issue peacefully. Beijing has supported the North's effort to normalize its ties with the US and Japan. China, while rejecting any US military move against the North, has tried to facilitate US-North Korea dialogue and negotiation to solve the Korean issues.

At first, China thought that improvements in the North-South Korean relations and its strategic partnership with the Clinton administration will surely lead the North to have warming relationship with the US. That's why China has supported the improvement of inter-Korean relations most. China thought that North-South Summit meeting in Pyongyang last year will have positive impacts on the future relationship between the North and the US. China also judged that after Dr. Perry's Pyongyang visit and dialogues over the North's missile issue, the US North Korean policies has become smooth. China supported the US decision to lift its economic sanctions against the North on September 1999 and also judged that the North Korea's diplomatic moves toward the South and the Europe was positive and correct ones.

From the Chinese perspectives, even though the North tried to reach an agreement on the missile issue with the US in November last year, Clinton's visit to Pyongyang was not realized. This caused great disappointment to the North, which was focusing on making a breakthrough in the North Korea-US relationship.

Immediately after the Bush administration reversed previous stands on the North Korea's terrorism, the relations between the US and North Korea became worse quickly. North Korea accused the US of aiming to commit state terrorism against her by escalating the country's military drills in South Korea and Japan while beefing up military presence there. North Korea asserts that it can not but clarify its stand once again as US persistently keeps the Asian country on its list of terrorist- supporting countries.¹²⁾

III. China's Posture Towards a Korean Peace Process: Issues-Areas

In fact, there are various issues relating to the Korean peace process. A peace structure means a reversal of the Cold War structure. Even though China has perceived that current situation on the Korean peninsula remains an extension of the past Cold War structure, she does not specify clearly which issues will be solved in order to establish a peace structure on the Peninsula. However, we will pick very fundamental issues which relate to the China's security, defense, and political interests as well as Korean Armistice Agreement.

1. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Development

The issue of nuclear proliferation has been regarded by the Chinese leadership as one of the biggest threats to its security and influence in the Northeast Asia. China believes that Pyongyang is a potential nuclear country. China judges that a nuclear North Korea would pose a significant new threat to its security interests, and it regards cooperation with other nuclear powers as essential in preventing non-nuclear states including Japan and South Korea from developing. That's why when the US asked for China's help in keeping the North from developing nuclear weapons further, China backed the US move.

In fact, China has played positive and active roles in solving the North's nuclear issue. Even though China's policy toward the North in the wake of China's nuclear tests was conflicted, it cooperated with the US to reject the legitimacy of North Korea's nuclear status. While China did not approve of US military actions to deter North Korea's going nuclear, it supported the US-North Korea discussions on stopping the North's development of nuclear weapons and confidence-building measures. China does not support IAEA's mandatory inspections on the North's past records of nuclear weapons. China demands every measure relating to the prevention of the North's going nuclear be a political solution rather than military one.

With regard to the North's missile development, China has perceived that the North's aims to develop nuclear and long-range missiles has been defensive in nature which makes it a useful instrument for preemptive attack but to have something as deterrence. China expected that this issue could be solved in exchange for the US normalization with the North and the withdrawal of USFK.¹³⁾

China's position on the North's missile issue has been changed from non-intervention to refusal of the North's long-range (possible medium-range) missile development. Why did China change her position? It was largely resulted from the joint pressure from the US, South Korea, and Japan. The North announced that it would suspend the missile-launching.

At first, China was cool to US efforts to prevent North Korea from developing a capability beyond minimum deterrence, which tacitly allows it long range missile status, while China has simultaneously worked with the US to deny the legitimacy of North Korea's nuclear status. China dismissed Pyongyang's launching of a missile as insignificant, and reasoned that North Korea as a sovereign country, has this right.¹⁴⁾ Thus, China did not reject North Korea's will. China believed overreaction to the missile-launching would encourage an arms race in this region and impede political dialogues between the US and the North, which is the most promising way to curb Pyongyang's missile program.

But later, China changed its position. China stressed that "it is not desirable to develop such weapons of mass destruction as nuclear and biochemical weapons and missiles on the Korean peninsula."¹⁵⁾ China began to judge that the North's long-range (possibly including medium-range missile) missile development would pose a serious military threat to Japan and South Korea, and could spark nuclear and missile races in which Japan abandons its current restrictions on armaments. Japan would find a good excuse to develop its highly sophisticated missile programs working with the US TMD project, which will eventually disrupt the current military balance in the Northeast Asia. Recently, when the North announced its will to suspend tests of missile launching till 2003, China supported the North. China wants Washington's commitment to the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which South Korea, the US and Japan agreed to provide two light-water reactors and fuel oil in return for the DPRK's suspension of its nuclear program. In the near future, China might pressure on the North not to export the short-range missiles and abiding the MTCR.¹⁶⁾ In sum, China has played positive but passive role in preventing Pyongyang from developing long-range missiles and will play a role in stopping the North developing medium-range missiles in near future. China will follow the US suit generally.

2. Maintenance of Military Armistice Agreement

China and North Korea was pitted against South Korea and the US along with the UNC. To enforce the Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established, and detailed arrangements were made for mutual arms inspections and mobile investigating teams. The mission of this arrangement was to prevent a post-armistice arms buildup by the introduction of additional personnel and weapons to the peninsula. However, it did not carry out a significant arms reduction or disarmament. Soon after the truce, however, it became evident that the North Koreans and their allies were unwilling to allow the NNSC to carry out its limited mandate. The MAA has remained the only peace instrument on the Peninsula so far.

During the critical period of 1988-1992, the North's sense of insecurity has increased with American unleashing its new generation of weapons on Iraq and Chinese anticipated diplomatic normalization with the South. Increased sense of insecurity forced Pyongyang to make the South's military threats reduced. Pyongyang accepted the South's proposal to conclude an agreement in December 1991 which stipulated that both sides abide by the Armistice Agreement while working to replace it with a peace treaty.

Nevertheless, few of the provisions of the 1991 agreement were carried out, and it was followed by the inter-Korean Basic Accord ("Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) and the Joint Declaration of De-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula") in February 1992. This agreement included a pledge to transform the state of armistice into a peace treaty, and to abide by the MAA until a state of peace was realized.

Even though the North and the South committed themselves to non-aggression, the political climate on the peninsula was getting worse than before. In stead of concluding a peace treaty with the South, the North changed its position and proposed to the United States on April 29, 1994 to replace the old armistice system with a new peace mechanism. Based on this proposal, the North withdrew its members from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in order to make up for the vacuum and set up the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army (KPA). Beijing was forced to withdraw the delegation of the Chinese People's Voluntary Army from Panmunjom in December 1994, and the delegation of the NNSC based on the North Korea-China side also left the country.

By recalling its representatives from the MAC, China's support for North Korea's action was different from what the North wanted. Practically, China's position has been supportive for Washington and Seoul's positions, which considers the present Armistice Agreement effective until a new structure is established. In short, Chinese role in maintaining the Armistice Agreement has been negative and passive one. What has been China's position toward the UNC? China has insisted that the UNC be abolished since it was a by-product of the Cold War. China argues that the UN did not dispatch its troops into the Korean War, but only the 16-nations multilateral forces(sixteen UN member nations) engaged in the Korean War. Thus, China rejects the UNC's dealing with the Korean issues. China also argues that China has rejected any military action against North Korea in the name of the UN without China's consent.

Even though the UNC has played significant role in deterring the North's attack against the South, there are, in fact, differences in opinions on the abolishment of the UNC and the representatives of concerned discussing the CBM on the Peninsula. Washington demands that any discussions on military CBM be among the UNC, the South and North Korea rather than between the two Koreas. However, Pyongyang wants a direct discussions with Washington excluding Seoul and Beijing and UNC. Beijing might want Four-Party Talks rather than the UNC to discuss the CBM on the Peninsula. Seoul might want to concentrate on utilizing the Seoul-Pyongyang direct military dialogue further with the UNC intact. President Kim Dae-jung said that South Korea hopes to reach an agreement with the North on implementing an inactive nonaggression pact signed in 1992 as the first step in ensuring peace when the Kim Jung-il visits Seoul, with the United States and China serving as guarantors.¹⁷⁾

3. China's Stands on the Signatories of the Peace Treaty

At first, North Korea apparently has insisted on a peace treaty and a simultaneous normalization with the US, which raises the question of plausibility.

North Korea can not conclude a peace treaty to end the Korean War directly only with the United States. This is not only because the war was never officially declared, but also because the South Korea, the US, and China reject the North's insistence. Seoul wants a direct peace agreement with Pyongyang with the US and China as endorsers. The US position is that the Armistice Agreement remains valid, and that any international discussions on replacing it must include both North and South Korea. China rejects a direct US-North Korea peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement.¹⁸⁾ China wants the two Koreas conclude a peace treaty replacing the armistice agreement in the process of the Four-party Talks.¹⁹⁾

China believes that part of problem between North and South Korea's instability is due to the failed attempt to reach a political settlement in 1953. China argues that it had battled against the United Nations, not against the South Koreans, so a peace treaty was not deemed necessary at the time of Beijing-Seoul diplomatic normalization in 1992.²⁰⁾

4. Question of the Presence and Status of USFK

China regards that even the presence of significant number of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) does not necessarily threaten China because their presence helps deter North Korea from attempting to unify the Peninsula by force of arms, a move that would not only threaten to drag China into unwanted conflict with both the US and Japan, but might well lead to the collapse of the North and reunification under the South.²¹⁾

China judges that the North would demand the withdrawal of the USFK at any rate. During the inter-Korean Summit meeting it is reported that North Korean leader Kim Jeng-il told President Kim Dae-jung that he would admit the presence of the USFK quite for a long time,²²⁾ China thinks that the North will utilize the USFK issue to get big consents from the US in discussing the establishment of diplomatic normalization. China might not demand the withdrawal of the USFK if the North accepts the USFK's changing role from deterring against the North to peace-keeping around the DMZ. China views that the US would not accept the North's demand of changing the status of the USFK any way. Also, China judges that the US and the South would not decide a complete withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean peninsula in ten years. Thus, There is no other option for China to prefer a limited change while keeping the present status quo of the USFK stable.

In regards to the signing of a peace treaty, however, China will not set a precondition on the reduction of the USFK as long as the two Koreas agree to sign a peace treaty. China will demand a significant reduction of USFK later. Even if the North would insist on a sizable reduction of USFK before signing a peace treaty between the two Koreas, China would overrule the North's demand. China believes that this political negotiation and agreement will be a plausible way to prevent the North from being threatened by the US and South Korea militarily.

China will at least endure a united Korea with reduced US forces stationed on the southern part of the Korean peninsula.²³⁾ With the unified Korea, China will demand total withdrawal of USFK at a time when China and the US would be strained to compete over Taiwan issue in some decades to come.

IV. Conclusion

China perceives the future Northeast Asian security environment will be highly unstable even though there will be positive signs between the two Koreas. China judges that the major threat to her security largely comes from the hawkish American policies against China and North Korea. China views that especially Washington's MD program and the strengthening its military relationship with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea will harm her security interests seriously.

In stead of fighting militarily against the US threats, China will set strategies in order to avoid direct military conflicts with the US on Taiwan and Korean problems.

With regard to Korean peace process, in general, China will play not a leading role but constructive one. China will play its role as a persuasive facilitator of inter-Korean peace talks. However, China's role in the Korean peace process will be positive and passive.

China will demand and prefer the Korean issues be solved through the dialogues and discussions between the concerned parties incrementally. If the US ignores the Four-party Talks, then China might not demand the Talks be held strongly. China does not want a US-North Korea peace treaty. China will likely to endorse only the inter-Korean peace treaty replacing the Armistice Agreement.²⁴⁾

While China will not demand a total withdrawal of the USFK from the Peninsula, China will demand the number of USFK reduced and Seoul not to join the US MD program. China might support the changing status of the USFK to peace-keeping role on the Peninsula. China might demand the dissolution of the UNC once the peace agreement concludes between the two Koreas. China will advise North Korea not to develop long and medium-range missiles development and might assist the North to upgrade its conventional arms.

Footnote

1) In a satellite interview with CNN on 2 May 1999, President Kim Dae-jung spoke about a five-point initiative he considered necessary for dissolving the Cold War structure of the Korean peninsula. He also strongly urged North Korea to abandon its path toward war and choose a path toward peaceful coexistence instead. He also expressed his hope for progress in the South-North authorities' talks. CNN, 1999. 5. 2.

2) It has been identified that perception has been one of the important determinants whether China takes actions that will lead to her involvement in the major conflicts in this region. Besides the perception, such factors as domestic politics, coercive diplomacy involving specific military capabilities in geographic contexts will lead to China's involvements in the major conflicts. see Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), p. 13.

3) China's White Paper on Defense [��] published in 1999 and 2000; "Chinese Radio Assails 'US Hegemony, High-handed Politics'," FBIS-CHI-1999-1215.

4) Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 1998. 7. 28.

5) Wang Jisi, "China's New Identity and Peace in Northeast Asia," Peaceful Order in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century, joint international seminar by the Korea Association of International Studies and Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2000. 5. 27, p. 8.

6) John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, "National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?" Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, p. 98.

7) Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," Foreign Affairs, July.August, 2000, pp. 53-63.; In addition, China decided to strengthen her R&D in military technologies. Chinese President Jiang Zemin stressed that China needs to quicken the pace of modernizing national defense and the armed forces according to the arrangements made in the 10th Five-Year Plan. He said: ".... With the sense of urgency that time waits for no man, all members of the armed forces should continue to advance the modernization of national defense and the armed forces.... The entire armed forces should unswervingly implement the strategy of strengthening themselves through science and technology and rely on scientific and technological progress for effectively increasing their fighting capacity.... see "Title: Jiang Zemin Addresses PLA Deputies Attending NPC Session," FBIS-CHI-2001-0309.

8) Yoon Dukmin, "US NMD Program and the Korean Peninsula (in Korean)," Korean Association of Political Science, 2001. 4. 20. p. 4.; Jonathan Schell, "The Folly of Arms Control," Foreign Affairs, Volume 79, No. 5, September.October 2000, p. 26.

9) US President George W. Bush, in his inaugural address last January, called the North Korea an "enemy of the world peace," He has repeatedly stated his resolve to develop and deploy the MD program to "defend our allies and interests" against the missile attacks from rogue states like the DPRK, Iraq and Iran."

10) Interview with Chinese scholar, 2001. 6.; China thought that it is not strange for Washington to call Pyongyang's threat to the United States because it is exactly the major "reason" for Bush to insist on deploying the National Missile Defense system and to continue stationing troops in the ROK and Japan.

11) FBIS-CHI-1999-0608.

12) "Title: Xinhua: DPRK Accuses US of Pressuring it with Issues of Kidnapping, Terrorism," FBIS-CHI-2001-0312; Rodong Sinmun (Workers' Daily, Pyongyang), March 12, 2001.

13) Pan Zhengqiang, "Nuclear Proliferation and the Security in Northeast Asia," the US-PRC-ROK Workshop, Seoul, 20001. 4. 6.

14) On March 9, 1999 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said China could not intervene in whether or not North Korea fired missiles or researched and developed nuclear weapons.

15) "Spokesman on Chi Haotian's Russia, UK, ROK Visits," FBIS-CHI-2000-0118; Yonhap News, 2000. 1. 20; "ROK, PRC DefMins Agree To Regular Annual Meetings," FBIS-EAS-2000-0120.

16) Bill Gertz, "Technology transfers a concern, U.S. says," Washington Times, 07/21/99, p. 4. PRC Embassy spokesman Yu Shining stated, "As a responsible member of the international community we have always abided by our commitments undertaken to abide by the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR."; Richard Speier, a specialist on the MTCR, stated, "A long-standing problem has been the peculiar formulation of the Chinese government's statement of support for the MTCR. It is left in doubt whether they are controlling component and technologies as required by the regime. Accelerometers and gyroscopes, depending on their specific characteristics, might well be covered by the regime." Speier said that the transfer by the PRC "could trigger sanctions" on the PRC and the DPRK if the equipment is covered by the MTCR. see Bill Gertz, "CHINESE COMPANIES SENT MISSILE PARTS TO N. KOREA," Washington Times, 07/20/99, p. 1; US Department of Defense's Early Bird news service for July 20, 1999.

17) Chosun Ilbo, 2001. 3.

18) After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, China perceived the US grand strategy as detering China's right to place itself in the international order. North Korea first maintained a more defensive posture toward China in order to improve its relations with the US, while Sino-American relations had been deteriorating. That is why the North excluded China from discussions on transforming the Armistice structure into a peace structure on the Peninsula.

19) Su Hao, "The Unification Process on the Korean Peninsula and Regionalism in East Asia," in The South-North Joint Declaration and Prospects for Peace in Northeast Asia, International Symposium by Korea Institute for National Unification, Korea Press Foundation, and Korean Information Service, 2000. 11. 2. pp. 76��77.

20) Seoul and Beijing ended a state of war implicitly with the joint statement establishing their diplomatic relations. Paragraph Two of the joint statement at the time of normalization stated that the two sides "agree to develop a lasting good-neighbor and friendly relationship," thus implying that the state of undeclared war between South Korea and China had ended.

21) Andrew Wedeman, "Prospects for a Sino-American Transition War", Kwang Il Baek, ed., Comprehensive Security and Multilateralism in Post-Cold War East Asia (Seoul: The Korean Association of International Studies), p. 79.

22) Beijing Review, 2000. 7. 26.

23) Jiefang Junbao (People's Liberation Army Daily), 2000. 7. 10; Shiping Tang, "A Neutral Reunified Korea: A Chinese View," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Fall.Winter, 1999, p. 466.

24) China's basic strategy through the Four-party Talks is to maintain its present influence over the peninsula and to get reasonable consultations through negotiations with the US and the South. Ever since Pyongyang insisted on dealing with the United States, an idea that was tacitly accepted by Washington, Four-party Talks did not produce concrete results that Seoul wanted. Without full consultations between the US and China on the Four-party Talks in advance, it will be difficult to bring about China's constructive role. China rejected the inclusion of Japan and Russia in multilateral talks on the Korean peace structure because it feared losing its influence over the Koreas. China has refused to take part in a US-led multilateral coalition because it has regarded it as a loss of Chinese initiative, and thus an acquiescence to the status quo in US-Japan and US-South Korea relations.

�� Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | June 2001