Summary report on the first roundtable "Towards Korean Unification: The Role of Europe", held in Berlin on 8th and 9th of March 2001
by Norbert von Hofmann
The Workshop 'Towards Korean Unification: The Role of Europe' was jointly organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Center for East Asia Pacific Studies, University of Trier.
18 Scholars, Government officials and politicians from Belgium, France, Great Britain, Sweden and Germany attended the one-day roundtable meeting, with the objective
to evaluate the process of change on the peninsula, its perspectives and the involvement of the European Union in the process made until today;
to look at European interests and European involvement in the management of the external dimensions of change on the peninsula;
to look at presently foreseeable and possible international economic implications of change on the peninsula, such as the need and the availability of financial support for North Korea.
Summary of Discussion
The meeting started by taking stock of the dynamics of change on the Korean Peninsula and the role of Europe.
It was noted:
There is a change in atmosphere, there is more realism but still with very little substance.
European countries have made a clear step forward towards more engagement in the North.
The growing diplomatic relations between EU member states and North Korea will assist North Korea's open-door policy and President Kim Dae-jung's 'Sunshine Policy'.
As the 11th of the 15 EU member states, the Federal Republic of Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea on March 1st, 2001. During the four days of negotiations in Berlin, the free movement of diplomats, journalists and officials of aid organizations was in the center of discussions. In the final memorandum of understanding it is stated, that in the future, travel applications from journalists will be approved, humanitarian organizations will be allowed to supervise projects and to distribute aid at any time and at their discretion. Diplomats will be granted access to closed areas within 48 hours if they so wish. And last but not least a human rights dialogue was agreed upon.
Luxembourg established diplomatic ties on the same day as Germany. Greece was expected to be the 13th EU member and Ireland had already indicated its willingness to normalize relations with North Korea. This left France as the only EU country that has no immediate plan to exchange ambassadors with the North, citing the worrisome human rights situation, the development of weapons of mass destruction and severe restrictions of international NGOs and aid organizations. North Korea accepted the accreditation of Seoul-based Diplomats to Pyongyang.
All participants in the workshop agreed, that there is indeed a major political change in and around Korea, especially since the North-South Summit in June 2000.
Will there be a second summit?
What would be its objectives: Confidence-building measures and / or to give Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy a new momentum?
One task of the workshop was to determine how much of the change is irreversible, and to predict, where the two Koreas will go from here.
Three possible scenarios were seen:
1. Opening of the economy
The obstacles are: the need for a fundamentally different political system, the missing political will for any changes, the enormous environmental problems.
2. Collapse and absorption
The problem areas: Possible migration of 2 to 4 million people from North to South. The impact on the South Korean economy. The necessary rescue operation for the South Korean economy, requiring the help of the US, Japan and the EU. The effects on the regional and international community in case of a sudden non-violent deterioration of the situation in North Korea.
3. Rehabilitation of North Korea
The costs were estimated at approximately 2 - 3 billion US$ per year. In the case of just trying to muddle through, about a total of 1 - 2 billion US$ per year including 500 million for food aid might be enough. The questions raised were: Who would pay for this? What could be the EU's contribution? What would Europe get in return?
The worst scenario, which was not discussed at the workshop, would certainly be war. But a collapse was also seen as risky and costly. Europe should therefore promote the idea of a soft landing rather than a collapse. This again raised the questions: 'Can Kim Jong-il keep control of a changing North Korea? Or may more openness and a better life prove destabilizing and a soft landing being only a prelude to collapse, like in Germany?'
Could China's open-door policy of 'maintaining party supremacy, but changing the economy' be a model for North Korea?
The main discussions concentrated then on the topic:
How could Europe effectively participate in Korea's unification process?
European involvement in the transformation up to now seems, by and large, driven by economic considerations, deference to the alliance with the US, and close cooperation with Japan. It is confined essentially to bilateral relations with the two Koreans and involvement in KEDO.
There is a consensus: the two Koreas and the four powers, US, China, Japan and Russia will remain the key players. Security matters play no central role for the EU's involvement in North Korea. It is not the intention of the EU to interfere with the US, but rather to facilitate the discussions, including the track-two level. The EU could encourage a stronger participation of North Korea in the ARF. A participation of North Korea in ASEM could be a learning experience.
A strong EU representation in Pyongyang combined with development aid programs might be able to counterbalance the more hard-line policy of the new US administration. Many Koreans see an important role for the Europeans in the raising of the `human rights issue' with regard to the North. It was noted with interest that North Korea, for the first time ever, used the term 'human rights' in talks with an EU delegation. This, however, would require a broader participation from the North Korean side. It would be necessary to include the military in confidence-building measures. Human rights issues and the human rights dialogue should be a strict precondition for any form of aid. Europe should especially press on two key areas: Access for Human Rights monitors and ratification of core human rights agreements. Europeans should also put a strong emphasis on non-proliferation.
As Europe's interests are far from being exclusively economic, the EU could contribute to the solving of the problem by bringing in its experiences in regional cooperation and multilateralism. The Europeans have considerable assets to promote multilateralism in North East Asia, notably:
substantial economic and financial involvement and resources;
diplomatic relations with the two Koreas and the key players in the region and credibility as an outside influence with no regional or global power aspirations;
participation in existing multilateralism, notably KEDO but also the UN Military Armistice Commission;
presence in the UN Security Council and
its own experiences with security multilateralism in Europe.
Europe is far away and has no vested interests, so it could be an honest broker. This might even correspond with North Korea's ideas.
Europe should use these assets more effectively and more actively. Its comparative advantages clearly are in the non-military dimensions of transformation management. A possible European strategy might be to promote, perhaps in close coordination with Japan, functionally specialized forms of multilateralism with the emphasis on co-equality. Proposals, which Europe could promote in this direction, include international efforts, loosely modeled after KEDO, in the fields of missiles capabilities, agricultural rehabilitation and infrastructure.
However, development assistance has to be subject to certain conditions, there is a need for more transparency, also in the field of humanitarian aid. Europe can assist in training North Korean personnel in negotiating with International Financial Institutions. The Europeans could push the US and Japan to bring North Korea closer to the ADB.
Whilst major projects on rehabilitation will have to be tackled by South Korea or eventually by International Finance Institutions, Europe could concentrate on micro-projects, leaving the macro level to the key players.
The Europeans could assist North Korea in the training on international relation. It was even suggested that North Korea might be the right place to start a kind of European Peace Corps.
A EU-University Exchange Program could be started with the North, etc..
Some of the participants saw KEDO in deep trouble financially and raised the question: Will the Light Water Reactors ever be built? Should they be built?
If the Europeans want to be a more visible player in North Korea, it is necessary to come to a consensus within the EU on its North Korea policy. A plan of action with precise benchmarks has to be set up, which has then to be 'sold' to the European public and to be discussed with South Korea and the US.
Europe should continue to send strong signals that it is interested in an improved EU - North Korea relationship without being instrumentalized. Europe should link this support to issues relevant to Europe e.g. human rights matters.
Better coordination between EU member states, the US, Japan, South Korea, Russia and China is necessary. As the major players have not yet fully stated their policy on North Korea it is difficult for the Europeans to find their place. Also North Korea has not clearly expressed in what fields it wants to cooperate with Europe. Is the survival of the leader the only motive for the flirt with Europe? It is difficult to prepare for a situation of which we do not know what it will look like.
¨Ï Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | June 2001