Session VI: Co-operative Security Policies in Asia: Could There be a Role for ARF?

Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific: Possibilities and Limits

by Kim Kyoung-Soo

I. What is 'Cooperative Security'?

   During the Cold War period when  a bi-polarity prevailed on the international scene, the management of international security affairs on the whole resorted to a bilateral method, i.e. bilateralism whose main characteristics are military alliances between the two parties concerned, whether they are a single state or a group of states(bloc) such as NATO and WTO.

   Nowadays since the demise of the old Soviet Union and its East European empire, the words, 'multilateralism' and 'cooperative security' have become a popular terminology in the conduct of each country's foreign policy and security affairs. Of course, cooperative security belongs to multilateralism which is often defined as structures or initiatives involving at least three or more nations and/or political entities in formulating security policies.

   It is important not to confuse 'cooperative security' with some concepts frequently used under the rubric of 'multilateralism', because they may be quite different, thus having a great deal of implications for regional security. In the first place, it is neither a 'collective security' such as envisioned in the League of Nations/UN Charter,  nor a 'defensive alliance' like NATO.

    The essential element of collective security is the rejection of alliances, expressed in the commitment of all members of the system to oppose any attack against another : "all for one, and one for all." The basic concept here is that peace is indivisible. Thus alliances for defense are mandated only if collective security fails.

   On the other hand, 'defensive alliance' is a kind of security cooperation that is associated with military alliances, and alliances of states tend to be formed against another state or a group of states. In short, what defines the alliance is common opposition to a common foe. The basic concept here is that deterrence is necessary, because without it there would be no constraint against aggression.

   In contrast, cooperative security - sometimes known as 'common security' - is based on a somewhat different set of assumptions. Here the focus is less on preventing unprovoked aggression, as it on counteracting probable causes of war -  especially, those which arise out of security dilemmas. Cooperative security policies require strategies which emphasize reassurance rather than deterrence. Reassurance strategies stress the need for military transparency and openness rather than military secrecy.

    This concept is well reflected in Karl Deutsch's words  'security community', which is defined as a group of states who have developed dependable expectations of peaceful change in intra-regional relations and ruled out the use of force as a means of problem-solving in inter-member relations.

II. Lessons from the Europe experience: OSCE

    Undeniably, the most representative case of cooperative security is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE was an important part of the drive to bring down the Cold War division and strengthen the post-Cold War rapprochement in Europe. Born as CSCE out of the Helsinki Final Accord of 1975, OSCE enabled Europe to maintain peace and security at a crucial period in history.

   The European experience is more useful if it can help deepen our understanding of the features and special demands of security situations in the Asia Pacific region. In this respect, a few points can be generalized therefrom. First, the European approach to cooperative security was gradualist in nature. It took more than a quarter century to become institutionalized, that is, as the OSCE regime. Progress was incremental. For instance, the first formal confidence-building measures (CBMs) were preceded by recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders and years of modest and informal economic and political exchanges.

   Secondly, Europe adopted a comprehensive approach, integrating political, military, social, and economic instruments into a relatively coherent package. The most apparent technique used in the CSCE negotiations was that of quid-pro-quo through issue linkages. When vested interests were in conflict, for instance, over the human dimension and the military dimension, issue linkage was frequently attempted. In using the strategy of issue linkage, neutral and non-aligned states played an important bridge-building role by acting as coordinators between the opposing positions.

   Thirdly, the achievement of security cooperation in Europe was based upon a set of preconditions. These preconditions included : ¨ç Political will and motivation arising from a shared perception among parties in conflict that an accord is preferable to the absence of agreement; ¨è Recognition of the legitimate rights and international position among the conflicting parties. This is concerned with both the political ability (leadership) of leaders and the international balance of power.

III. The ARF as a Cooperative Security Process

   There have been many security-related multilateral dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region. According to a survey done by a Canadian research institute during a six-month period in the latter half of the 1990s, 13 official and 49 Track-II politico-security related dialogues took place. While many of these meetings were one-time affairs, the survey identified over 40 institutionalized forums aimed at promoting political, economic, or security discussions. Some of these forums date back to the 1970s, but the most ambitious and potentially significant, such as ARF, CSCAP, NEACD, are of more recent vintage and focus on political or security-related issues.

   Among the new forums, the first and foremost is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).  ARF is the only forum among governments for multilateral cooperation, and political and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific area as a whole including Northeast Asia. This forum of 23 participants includes, among others, the US, Japan, Russia, China, the EU, and has been playing an important role for the improvement of regional security environment. North Korea became a member at last year's ministerial conference. This means that finally all the relevant countries of Northeast Asia are ARF members.

   ARF represents an ambitious attempt to ensure peace and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific through a systemic framework with ASEAN at the core. More or less, the ARF process does reflect the importance of the OSCE example in the implementation of confidence building measures (CBMs). The central importance of confidence building to the ARF was apparent when participants at the First ARF Meeting in Bankok in July 1994 agreed on "the need to develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia Pacific."

   The Second ARF meeting (1995) adopted a Concept Paper that envisages three stages of the cooperative security process:

         Stage I : Promotion of Confidence Building Measures

         Stage II : Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms

         Stage III : Development of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

It is worthwhile to note that a series of functional groups and meetings within the ARF framework began to gain momentum starting in the third year. That is, the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures identified five CBM items: dialogue on security perceptions, defense policy publication, enhancing high-level defense contacts and exchanges among defense staff colleges and training, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and additional confidence building measures. The ISG plays an important role in the ARF development process in terms of advancing practical cooperation measures.

   The Iner-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Search and Rescue Coordination and Cooperation (SAR) dealt with the following areas:  increased sharing of training facilities and expertise in the region, further cooperation between training institutions and the facilitation of a greater flow of information, movement towards standardization of SAR manuals, training and procedures, and possible increased practical training and exercises. Another Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISG) on Peacekeeping Operations discussed three items: current status of UN peacekeeping operations, training for peace support operations, and stand-by arrangements for close cooperation with the UN.

   The ARF is also committed to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the foreign ministers at the 4th ARF meeting reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the 1953 Armistice Agreement of the Korean War until a permanent peace treaty is signed. They welcomed then the proposed four party talks that could pave the way to a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. They also expressed support for the progress made by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in implementing the Agreed Framework of 1994 and reaffirmed continued support of the ARF to KEDO.

   More recently, the Chairman's Statement of the 7th ARF meeting expressed support for the historic North-South Summit along with its Joint Declaration in June 2000. In this meeting North Korea was admitted to ARF thus enlarging its membership to 23 countries including all six states in Northeast Asia.

                Conceptual Framework of the ARF Process

IV. Prospects for the Future

    Despite a decent amount of achievements especially in the field of confidence building,  ARF has yet a long way to go if it is to be substantially meaningful in the course of establishing a multilateral cooperative security framework modeled on CSCE. Indeed, it will not be easy to attain the state of cooperative security embodied in the CSCE/OSCE process for the following reasons. That is, the initial conditions for security regime formation are unfavorable in comparison with Europe due to Asia-Pacific geopolitical factors. due to

    First, Asia-Pacific is a vast area stretching from West Asia and the Persian Gulf to East Asia and the Pacific including Australia and New Zealand and the islands of the South Pacific Ocean. For this reason there exists geographical, historical, political, cultural and social heterogeneity among the countries in this region. Therefore, Asia-Pacific lacks a common identity or consciousness.

    Second, there is no common perception of an external threat as is the case with NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) during the Cold War period. This means that motivation for security regime formation is comparatively weak.

    Lastly, there are still serious territorial disputes to be resolved in the Asia-Pacific region. Multilateral security cooperation in the region would make sense only after the various disputes are settled through peaceful means. For one thing, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 provided the critics of the ARF with their pretext that it lacks a direct mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, especially when a big power is involved in international hostilities.

    In addition to these geopolitical obstacles, there are certain intramural  limits to the ARF becoming an effective security regime in the region. One is the leadership of ASEAN as a chief initiator and the relationships between/among ASEAN and external powers such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia. In fact, ASEAN's initiation of the ARF was possible in large part due to congruent supports of major powers. However, a detente-like mood among great powers during the Clinton administration's tenure has disappeared when the new Bush administration took power in the United States. For instance, the Missile Defense (MD) project that President Bush is determined to pursue is adamantly opposed by Russia and China, which might dampen any constructive movements within the ARF process with regard to confidence building measures (CBMs).

     In addition, there is concern that there might be a hegemonic competition between ASEAN, and the major powers over who will be the 'primary driving force' in the ARF's cooperative security process as it becomes more institutionalized.

    Institutionalization of the ARF is another issue that requires consensus among the members. Even though there is a common perception that the ARF needs to be further institutionalized, it is not easy to do so in the foreseeable future, because there are different views with regard to the speed of institutionalization between the ASEAN countries and the Western countries. In other words, the former prefer a gradual approach whereas the latter hope to see rapid development of the ARF into a more effective security regime.

    In conclusion, the ARF was created through ASEAN initiative to cope with the uncertain security environment of the post-Cold War era. The creation of the ARF was of great significance, because it was the first official multilateral security framework in the Asia-Pacific region. Even though the ARF is still in the midst of security regime formation, it can be said that it has stabilized security relations in the region through a 'habit of dialogue' or 'habit of cooperation'.

    As a cooperative security regime, ARF will continue to be a forum for constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues in Asia-Pacific. However, the tremendous challenge of how to institutionalize the present ARF into an OSCE-type security regime depends upon the leadership of external major powers including the US, China, and Russia, not to mention the continued support of ASEAN countries.