Session III: The Role of Multilateralism: Germany's 2+4 Process and its Relevance for the Korean Peninsula


 Is the German '2+4' Process Applicable to the Korean Peninsula? 

by In-Kon Yeo


I. Introduction

   Since the end of World War II the Koreans and the Germans had suffered from the division of their territories and peoples. Even though the Germans accomplished the unification in October 1990 as a result of their ceaseless efforts to overcome the division, the Koreans have not yet realized it.

   In spite of signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonagression, Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea in December 1991, mutual distrust and military hostilities have continued for a long time. At the present time, South Korean president Kim Dae-jung is carrying out the engagement policy toward North Korea aiming at improvement of inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation and cooperation. His basic position is that the issues related to the reconciliation and cooperation between South and North Korea should be dealt with at the South-North dialogue. while the questions about tension reduction and creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula should be discussed and agreed at the Four-Party-Talks among South and North Korea, the U.S. and China. And the South Korean government is regarding the question of unifying Korea as a matter of the remote future.        

   This article's purpose is to analyze the historical process of settling the German problem, especially the important decisions made at the '2+4' Talks and to judge whether the German '2+4' process could be also applicable to the case of the Korean problem or not.

 II. Concept of 'German Problem' and Five Partial Questions

   In general, 'German problem' means the questions caused by the German defeat in World War II and by the division of Germany in the period from 1945¡­1949. It was a very important problem in the world politics after 1945 and one of controversial issues between the West and the East in the era of Cold War.

   German problem was originally composed of five subordinate questions; ¨ç Saar, ¨è Berlin, ¨é Oder-Neisse border, ¨ê conclusion of peace treaty with Germany, ¨ë reunification.

   The Saar question of these five questions has been already settled in the 1950s. After World War II the Saar was severed from Germany and again it was returned after a referendum conducted   under the FRG-France agreement of October 1956. The reintegration of the Saarland on January 1, 1957 was effected in accordance with article 23 of the Basic Law - an unprecedented step which was to serve as a model for German unification in 1990.1) Though the Four Powers(the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, and France), the FRG and the GDR sought to find solutions for the remaining four questions, it was impossible for them to find out common grounds due to their different ideological, political and military positions.

   It was in the early 1970s that they came to tentative agreements regarding the unsolved questions. The Brandt government of the FRG concluded some modus vivendi on the contractual renunciation of force on the basis of the territorial status quo with such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR.

   In negotiations on a treaty normalizing relations, the FRG and the Soviet Union renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no territorial claims, and it recognized de facto the Oder-Neisse border and the border between the FRG and the GDR. However, FGR negotiators insisted that such agreements did not alter the West German position on future reunification of the country and that the responsibilities of the Four Powers in Germany remained unchanged by the treaty. They also linked the signing of the treaty to a Soviet promise to open talks on normalizing the Berlin situation. After the Soviet Union had agreed to these conditions, the Treaty of Moscow was signed in August 1970.  

   In December 1970, the FRG and Poland signed the Treaty of Warsaw. The treaty contained essentially the same points as the Treaty of Moscow on the question of Poland's western border, the renunciation of territorial claims by the FRG, and the ongoing responsibilities of the Four Powers.

   Concurrent with the negotiations on the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, the Four Powers undertook to end disagreement about the status of Berlin in talks that ultimately led to the Quadripartite Agreement of September 1971. The Four Powers agreed that the status quo of Berlin should not be changed unilaterally. The Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR was signed in December 1972. In the treaty, both states committed themselves to developing normal relations on the basis of equality, guaranteeing their mutual territorial integrity as well as the border between them, and recognizing each other's independence and sovereignty. To many conservatives, West Germany's de facto recognition of East Germany as a separate state was a final blow to the possibility of Germany's reunification. There have been no great changes in these political situations until the late 1980s.  

III. Settlement of German problem through '2+4' Process 

  The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was the beginning of great changes in Germany. After the first free elections in GDR in March 1990, the critics of the SED regime took over the government. Thereafter, the Germans paved the ways to the reunification. The Treaty on the Monetary, Economic, and Social Union of May and the Unification Treaty of August 1990 were signed between the FGR and the GDR in order to solve the internal problems in the process of unification. However, German reunification could not be realized without the agreement of the Four Powers. For the purpose of eliminating the international political and legal obstacles, the '2+4' Talks among the two German states and the Four Powers were held in four sessions from May to September 1990.

   The problems that should be solved in the international political aspect included the guarantee of the united Germany for European security and peace, the recognition of the present European border by the united Germany, the status of the united Germany in the new European security order, the restoration of sovereignty of the united Germany, the role of the united Germany in the process of participating in the CSCE, whether the neighboring countries agree to the united Germany or not, whether the united Germany is obliged to compensate the victims of World War II for the damages or not, and so on. On the other hand, the problems that should be solved in the international legal aspect included the recognition of European border and the renunciation of the former German Empire' territories by West and East Germany, whether the Four Powers and EC agree to the German unification or not, whether a peace treaty with the united Germany should be concluded or not.2)         

  The important decisions made at the '2+4' Talks, which were reflected upon the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany("2 plus 4" treaty) of September 1990, are as follows:

- the united Germany shall comprise the territory of the FRG, the GDR, and the whole of Berlin;
- the united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law;
- the united Germany reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons;    
- the government of the FRG undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 within three to four years;
- the united Germany and the USSR will settle by treaty the conduct of the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the GDR and of Berlin which will be completed by the end of 1994;
- the right of the united Germany to belong to alliances shall not be affected by the treaty;
- the Four Powers terminate their rights and responsibilities  relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As a result, the corresponding, related quadripartite agreement, decisions, and practices are terminated and all related Four Power institutions are dissolved;    

  Even though the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was not a peace treaty between Germany and the Four Powers, the four partial questions in German problem, i.e. reunification, Berlin, Oder-Neisse border, and peace treaty, were solved. The Four Powers recognized the German unification and granted full sovereignty to the German people with this treaty. As a result of this, Germany which accomplished its unification in October 1990 appeared on the international stage as a sovereign state with full rights to self-determination. And the Yalta system that had been maintained since 1945 came to an end.     

IV. The Relevance of German Experiences to the Korean Peninsula

    1. Situations of the Korean Peninsula

   Geopolitically the Korean peninsula is a strategic point in Northeast Asia, as Germany in Europe. Therefore, since the end of the nineteenth century it has been a place where the political, military and economical interests of continental powers have collided with those of ocean powers. Under these circumstances Korea was dominated by Japan in the period from 1910 to 1945. Immediately after the liberation from the japanese colonial rule, the Korean peninsula was divided into the Southern and the Northern part, because U.S. president Truman and the General Secretary of the Soviet Union Stalin decided to disarm the Japanese troops along the 38th Parallel. Along with the advent of the Cold War, the two states were established on the Korean peninsula in 1948.

   With the establishment of People's Republic of China in October 1949, the communist side attained superiority over the democratic side in Northeast Asia. Taking it into consideration, Kim Il Sung took an initiative in launching an attack against South Korea in June 1950 and waged war, receiving not only direct military aids from Mao Tse-tung but also indiect support from Stalin. The Korean War waged for three years resulted in signing of a truce agreement among the U.S., China and North Korea.

   Since then, there have been constant efforts in vain to build up mutual confidence between South and North Korea and to transform the truce agreement into a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. In order to create durable peace, the South Korean and the U.S. government made proposal of the Four-Party- Talks among South and North Korea, the U.S., and China in April 1996. After the acceptance of the North Korean side, the  Four-Party-Talks has been held six times until August 1999. However, they could not produce any results due to differences in positions between the U.S.-South Korean camp and North Korea. Since then, the Four-Party-Talks have been suspended. While South Korea and the U.S. maintain the position of building up mutual confidence gradually from areas that could be implemented, North Korea repeatedly tries to include issues of withdrawing U.S. military forces from South Korea and concluding the U.S.-North Korea peace treaty in the agenda. Russia and Japan are very interested in participating in multilateral talks dealing with the  Korean problem.

  2. Comparison of German '2+4' Process with the Korean Situation

   The German problem was not only a national one that should be settled between West and East Germany, but also a international one that should be solved among the Four Powers. Therefore, when the Four Powers and the East Germany were not opposed to theGerman unification in early 1990, it was inevitable for them to hold '2+4' talks due to the Four Powers' international legal rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole.

   There leaves no room for doubt that the Korean problem is also not only a national but also a international one. However, unlike the  the German problem, no Powers surrounding the Korean peninsula have certain international legal rights and responsibilities relating to Korea. They have only vital  interests in the Korean peninsula in the political, military and economic aspects. Paradoxically, it means that it would be very difficult or impossible for the Koreans to secure peace on the Korean peninsula and for the long run to accomplish a unification without their support or agreement. In this context, it is important for the Koreans to make them play a certain role in creating durable peace mechanism on the Korean peneinsula and in achieving the united Korea.

   Taken into consideration that in the Korean War South and North Korea, the U.S. and China were the states virtually waging war and signing the truce agreement, it is a very appropriate and rational decision based on the international law that the four countries should play a key role in transforming the armistice agreement into a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. In case of signing a South-North peace agreement, the U.S. and China could take part in it as guarantors. Japan and Russia, which have Comparison of Germany with Korea  

 

divided Germany

divided Korea

background of division

Four Power's occupation and advent of the Cold War

occupation of the U.S. and the SU and advent of the Cold War

Power's interests

international political and legal rights and responsibilities

no international legal rights, but international political   interests

war

no war

ROK-U.N.  against DPRK-China-S.U.;

truce agreement among U.S.-China-DPRK

territorial disputes

Saar, Oder-Neisse, Berlin

no territorial disputes

management of division

recognition of status quo in Europe with Ostpolitik

engagement policy

pending issues

Oder-Neisse border, Berlin, peace treaty, unification.

South-North Dialogue,   CBM, WMD, peace mechanism, unification(long-term aspect)

international order

Cold War

post-Cold War

preconditions for unification

recognition of Oder-Neisse border, entry into NATO, arms reduction, renunciation of ABC weapons, guarantee for security and financial support for reforms of SU.

arms reduction

renunciation of ABC weapons,

Chinese and Russian    calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops

great interests in the Korean problem, might participate in creating a peace mechanism as endorsers. Though Japan and Russia prefer  the Six-Party-Talks to the Four-Party-Talks, the four countries related to the Four-Party-Talks are against the Six-Party-Talks on the grounds that it would be more difficult to reach certain agreements at the Six-Party-Talks. Especially, North Korea regards it as premature.

  In case of successful creation of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula by signing a South-North peace agreement at the Four-Party-Talks, along with improvement of inter-Korean relations, the question of unifying Korea could be discussed and consulted at multilateral talks such as '2+4'. At the inter-Korean talks, South and North Korea should deal with the issues related to the political unity and the monetary, economic and social union, while at the '2+4' talks the Koreans should do utmost to obtain the four power's consent and support for the united Korea. For this purpose, it would be necessary for the Koreans to express their intentions and readiness to renounce the possession of ABC weapons and to conduct arms reduction of the united Korea. In addition, the question of changing the status of the U.S. troops in South Korea should be discussed between the South Korean and the U.S. government. It is because China and Russia will call for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the united Korea. Like in the German '2+4' process, the question about military status of the united Korea would come to a heated controversy at the '2+4' talks.

   If the Western countries and the FRG had not guaranteed the national security of the Soviet Union and not supported financially its reforms, the FRG might not have realized the German unity. It gives a lesson to the Koreans that getting rid of neighbouring countries' concerns over the united Korea and accumulating  economic power of South Korea are not less important than negotiating with the four powers at multilateral talks on the Korean unification.

           


Footnote

1) Facts about Germany (Frankfurt/Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1992) pp. 53¡­54.

2)  Gilbert Gornig, "Der Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag unter besonderer Berücksichtigung grenzbezogener Regelungen," Recht in Ost und West, Heft 4 (April 1991), 35. Jahrgang, pp. 97¡­106.

 
 ¨Ï Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | June 2001