The Role of NGOs in Politics in Modern West-Europesn Societies*

 

 

by Dr. Ernst Hillebrand, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn

 

* Presentation at the 3rd Roundtable for Human Right and Peace on "The Third Ways of Social Democracy and Social Movement" in Seoul on June 26, 2000, organized by Sungkonghoe University and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung


1. NGOs are a State's best friends

NGOs have evolved in the last two decades as new and genuine elements of politics. They play a role not only in domestic politics, but, with increasing importance, also in international politics. The TV-pictures of the "battle of Seattle", where a transnational coalition of NGOs and interest groups has partially paralysed one of the most important international negotiating processes of our times - the discussions about the further development of the world trade system - drove home the message world-wide: NGOs do play a role in politics - nationally and internationally.

On a symbolical level, the images of Seattle were conveying a well-known and familiar idea: that NGOs are a kind of corrective political force, a counter-weight against the overarching powers of state bureaucracies and political elites: Inside, them, the cold and anonymous negotiating machinery of the WTO and its member countries; outside: We, the people.

Yet, these pictures, as convincing and persuasive they may have been, were deceptive in several ways. In the daily reality of politics, the NGO vs. State - logic of NGOs has waned since quite a time. On the contrary: NGOs are - at least in the "mature" democracies of the Western societies - on their way to become the State's best friends. 

2. Why NGOs?

Why do NGOs exist altogether? The question is complex and intrinsically related to social and political changes in Western societies. I would suggest that there are four fundamental processes which explain the emergence of NGOs as serious political actors in West European societies.

a) Reflexive Modernity

Anthony Giddens, the academic master-mind of the "Third Way" has in various writings tried to analyse the shape and dynamics of post-traditional society. Central to his thinking is the notion of "manufactured risks". Insecurity, he argues, does in the scientific age no longer originate in man's inability to master the threats imposed to him by an uncontrollable nature. Today, the major threats to our life and security come from "within" human society itself. The risk of mass destruction, the risk of the destruction of the very basic prerequisites of human existence (as natural resources, bio-diversity, ozone-layer etc.), the risks of social disintegration are brought about by technological and scientific developments. The age-old struggle of man to ban insecurity out of his existence via technological innovation and scientific progress has failed; the very instruments he used to wage this struggle - scientific and technological progress - have proven to be at the origin of always new risks. So, systemically, no "security" is left: Ulrich Beck, today's most influential German sociologist speaks in this respect of the "age of the side-effect": Any wished-for positive effect of scientific innovation is accompanied by a host of "side-effects" which are not positive and not wished for.

Man, under these circumstances, is forced to take another stand to his own doing: he has to reflect continuously the possible unwanted effects of his undertakings. Society as whole becomes "reflexive", and has to take a critical and analytical approach to itself1.

b) Scientificization

A second consequences of the age of "manufactured risks" is the "scientificization" of political and social processes. If the central driving force of change and the primary source of collective insecurity is of scientific or technical origin, than any attempt to asses and master these effects has to root in scientific and technological knowledge itself. Hence, intellectual capacities and scientific knowledge become central elements in social and political controversy. Evidently, this tends to change in a significant way the "balance of power" within the political arena. If the assessement of risks implied by a given scientific or industrial procedure becomes a central political controversy, any citizens with corresponding scientific knowledge will be able to participate at the discussion - often at a far higher degree of competence than politicians and government officials, who almost necessarily are non-experts. Ecology tended to be the first thoroughly "scientifized" policy field in western societies. So it is not surprising, that in Western Europe the rise of non-governmental expertise and scientific knowledge has been closely linked to the development of the ecological movement in the 1970s and 80s.

c) The society of the smart people

This point is closely linked to the emergence of what James N. Roseau has called the "Society of the smart people". The world as a whole, but especially the OECD-countries have witnessed in the last fifty years a continuous expansion of second- and third level education. This "skill revolution" has, combined with rapidly expanding availability of information in the "information age", led to a rapid increase in competence inside society. Knowledge is no longer restricted to exclusive circles of professional experts or bodies; it is fairly equally distributed at different levels of society. As a consequence, "...elites are conceived to retain control over resources, communications and policy-making processes, but they are also viewed as increasingly constrained by publics who follow their activities, who are more skilled at knowing when to engage in collective action, and who are ever ready to demand appropriate performances in exchange for support."2

d) The Changing Character of the State

Last but not least, the character of the State itself has changed. The classical mechanisms of government by political institutions have been replaced by a far more complex system of governance, in which society itself plays a much more active role. Instead of formulating (in the processes of political decision-making inside the political class, the bureaucracy and parliament) and executing political decisions in a hierarchically organised top-down approach, the state today acts more of less as a "notary". He codifies, "officialises" and implements political results, which have primarily been developed and matured inside society itself. Politics turn out to be the result of bargaining-processes within policy-networks, in which not only politicians and the administration participate, but where representatives of the social and economic interests at stake are systematically represented. The state becomes a "negotiation-state"3.

This redefinition of the role of the state in the process of policy-making is the result of many developments:

  a growing autonomy of the economy: enterprises gained considerable room for manoeuvre by the "denationalising" dynamics of globalisation; this process has limited considerably the capacity of the state to intervene in the economic sphere;

   a rapid increase in complexity of political decisions to be taken, which would structurally exceed the state's institutional capacities; private knowledge and expertise are needed to find adequate and socially acceptable solutions;

  The increasing demand of society to take an active part in decision making (which has its roots in the developments mentioned above).

  A decreasing capacity of traditional political institutions like political parties to aggregate and represent the society in its growing diversity and complexity; this trend is accelerated by the dissolution of the traditional social structures of the "industrial age" and the emergence of new and more complex patterns of social stratification and identity in the "post-industrial" society.

3. Predecessors and Helping Hands

Within this institutional framework of the "negotiation-state" NGOs have finally emerged as new actors, forcing their way into the political bargaining circles. This has been made possible by two processes:

  The emergence in the 1970ies and '80ies of  the so called "new social movements" which were, at a given moment, able to mobilise for their cause important parts of society. These movements - Women's movement, ecological movement, peace-movement, citizens-rights-movement, gay- and lesbian-rights movements, to name just a few - could not totally be excluded from the policy-formulation processes.

  Evidently, this development was related to the fact, that these movements were able to gain considerable support in the media and public opinion. It is interesting to refer here to the concept of "deliberative politics", as Jurgen Habermas has formulated it. The political system consists, in this understanding, of various circles; the state bureaucracy is only a kind of core element. Basic political processes tend to be prepared, negotiated and made accepted in the outer spheres of the political system within a process of "rational" argumentation. It is in these areas of "public politics" where the new social movements - and their political heirs, the NGOs - had been able to master considerable support and influence. Media - especially television - which covered their activities and thus popularised their issues and concerns were crucial to that process. Peter Wahl, one of the most lucid analysts of the German NGO-movement, refers to that link between NGO-influence and the media, when he states that "the power of the NGO is only borrowed from the media". 

4. State? NGO Relations Today: From Friendly Co-existence to Cosy Relations

NGOs have become established actors in the political negotiating process inside Western soceties but also in international politics. They are accepted as advocates of weak interests (as compared to the socio-economic and cultural interests represented by the established social forces like business, trade unions or the churches) and of 'public goods" which do not fit into the array of classical "public goods' which the state has to deliver: protection of property and the underlying economic and social order, Security, respect of the law and constitution.

The basic features of this new equilibrium between the state and the NGOs within the extended negotiating framework of post-traditional modern states can be described as follows:

1.  The weakening of the state in the process of neoliberal restructuration of western societies since the 1980ies has given NGOs increasing opportunities to influence political processes; non-state actors today are increasingly important to deliberative political procedures;

2.  The complexity of problems has increased; scientific knowledge and expertise have become more important; specialised institutions which can proceed scientific information and make it accessible to the political decision-making process become ever more important. NGOs play an important role here.

3.  The ways in which the basic political consensus is produced within societies have changed. NGOs - just because they are diverse and heterogeneous - play an important role within that system of "consensus-politics", as they tend to complete and supplement the established political interests already involved in the process.. But their influence is generally much weaker than that of other non-state actors, like business and the media;

4.  NGOs have developed significantly from their origins inside the broader social movements of the 1970ies and 80ies. Contrary to the 'new social movements", they do not put into question the legal and institutional framework, or broader, the social order, within they are active. They are reformist by nature. They have adopted a "professionalized" style of action, based on expertise and co-operation within decision-making-processes instead of collective action and experiences, mass-mobilisation and -politicisation. The participation of NGOs in the processes of deliberative politics depends more from the quality of the input they can deliver than from their social representativeness.

5.  NGOs tend to have been co-opted into the instrumental array of the "extended state". Many of them receive direct or indirect public funding. They have established and strong links to those departments of local, regional or federal government which are responsible for the policy field the NGOs are active in (or which give funding to them). This is not only true for Germany. Thomas Carothers recently pointed out that "...even in the US, governmental funding of civil society is much more extensive than many people realize... Government is almost twice as significant a source of income for American non-profit organisations as is private giving..."5

6.   NGOs tend to concentrate their activities not on the legislative power, but on the executive power, i.e. the administration. This reflects the shifting balance of power between legislation and executive power in the western states within the last twenty years.

7.   In international arenas, NGOs form more or less part of the "German delegation" and serve as pool of expertise to the official negotiating delegation. This has been true for almost all of the major UN-Conferences of the recent years "be it at Beijing, Cairo, Copenhagen, Istanbul" or even Seattle.6

So what we are witnessing now, is a kind of symbiotic relationship between the state and the NGOs. This friendly co-existence between NGOs and the state bureaucracy is of benefit for the state and, in a larger sense, for the political system as a whole. NGOs play a vital role in the integrative mechanism of democratic political systems as they:

-  indicate actual problems in diverse spheres of society;

-  aggregate and regroup disparate "weak interests" which are by the means of NGOs integrated into the political system;

-  make the expertise and know-how accumulated in epistemic and scientific communities available for the political process;

-  reinforce and complete official resources on the international level;

-  create new avenues of political participation outside the established mechanisms of party politics;

-  Increase the problem-solving capacities of the political system while increasing the degree of transparency and accountability.

Summarising this trend, we would rather see NGOs no more as the antagonists of the state. To come back to the images from Seattle: It is not "we" and "them". In reality, it is something which sounds more and more like "us".

5. New Challenges

In the end, the "Battle of Seattle" was only a last, more or less symbolic confrontation between civil society and the world of states. The old "adversary" of the new social movements - an authoritarian, patriarchal, non-accountable and technocratic state, deeply enmeshed with mighty economic and social interests - does no longer exist. Partially it has been buried by the new social movements and the NGOs themselves; partially it fell victim - as did the "new social movements" - to the rise of neo-liberal anti-etatism as the dominating ideological paradigm in Western societies.

Today, the most important threat to the "weak interests', represented by NGOs, as well as to the citizens rights do no longer come from "big government". These interests and values are increasingly put into question by the economic sphere, which tends to delegitimise and eliminate any sphere of society which is not organised according to the market-principle and not open to commercial exploitation. Globalisation has dramatically reduced the degree of public control over the economy. The established order of the "embedded liberalism" of Western societies, in which a democratic state created the legal and institutional frame within which the market forces were free to operate, has been weakend significantly.

More important, the technological dynamic within the economic sphere is nowadays more or less beyond any public or political control. These developments are, to come back to the terms of Anthony Giddens "manufactured risks" in their purest form. Actually they tend to reach a new quality by the manipulation of the very basic elements of nature and human life by the new "life-sciences'(genetic engineering, bio-technologies and reproduction-technologies).

These developments given, there is an increasing tendency within the NGO movement to try to protect the political sphere against the ongoing attempts of "hostile take-over" by the economy. The democratic state is the big last island of non-market, non-economic forms of social interaction beyond the immediate private sphere. It is - still - the purveyor of public goods which neoliberalism wants either to abolish or to commercialise. Last but not least, the democratic state is accessible to rational argumentation - the only "power resource" the NGOs do dispose of. The state, being weak and instrumental to the economy as it may be, still is a bulwark against the "totalitarism" of the market, where interests, which have no financial resources, are ignored, and goods, that have no price, are not produced. This is the new central challenge for the NGOs: to conserve social and political spheres which are not subdued to the market principle and which are - at least partially - open to the procedures democratic governance.

6. The Transnational Perspective

The events in Seattle have been a very clear indication for the emergence of new "transnational' arena for NGOs and social movements. The ongoing internationalisation of politics implies automatically, that also non-state-political actors - and NGOs want to be political actors - have to pass over the borders of national politics. This is particularly true in some of the fields where NGOs tend to be particularly engaged: Ecology, development questions, social policy. In Western Europe, with the growing integration of the European Union there tends to be literally no significant political question left which does not have an European aspect or dimension. So it is not surprising to see, that many NGOs and NGO-networks do have their own representation at Bruxelles, whose only purpose is to follow the development of the EU-policy making process.

A second aspect of the need for the growing transnational dimension lies in the increasing importance of international regimes and organisations. Very decisive decisions, concerning the economic and social fate of whole societies tend to be made inside international organisations like World Bank, IMF or WTO. NGOs have to react to that development by adding an international dimension to their activities. Generally, this is done by the integration into transnational "NGO-networks", which try to coordinate acitivities of like-minded organisation on an international scale and which have developed considerably in the last years.

A additional rationale for a transnational dimension for NGOs-activities lies in the globalisation of the economy. "Big business" - especially in form of the transnational corporations - has outgrown the limits of any given nation state. States may like to put limitations to that , but they tend to be more and more unable to do that. So any attempt to (re)regulate parts of the economic sphere - as the financial system - any attempt to regain a minimum of public control of technological developments has to have an international dimension.

7. A  New Equilibrium

What can we expect from such a new orientation of the NGO-movement? Nobody would like to advocate for a new type of confrontation between civil society and the economic sphere. What we should aim for, is in a certain way, a repetition of history. Like civil society was in the last thirty years able to make the Western state more open, transparent, participatory and accountable, we should now try to make the great corporations more open, more transparent, participatory and accountable. Also this new formula of society-economy-relations would be of mutual benefit. And it would considerably reduce the probability, that "manufactured risks" will compromise the future of our societies.

 


Endnotes

1    Anthony Giddens, Jenseits von Links und Rechts, [Beyond Left and Right], Frankfurt/M., 1997, p. 118 - 123.

2    See James N. Rosenau, Along the domestic-foreign Frontier, Cambridge 1997, p. 61.

3    This "neo-corporatist" model of stateness and political order is in Germany closely linked to the writings of a group of scientists working at the Cologne-base "Max-Planck-Institute fuer Sozialforschung", esp. Wolfgang Streeck, Fritz W. Scharpf, Adrienne Heritier and - internationally - to the oeuvre of Philipe Schmitter.

4     Peter Wahl, Mythos und Realitaet intrnationaler Zivilgesellschaft, in Elmar Altvater (Ed.) Vernetzt und verstrickt, Nichtregierungsorganisationen als gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft, Muenster, 1997.

5     Thomas Carothers, Think again: Civil society, in Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000, S. 18-29.

6     Ulrich Brand, Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Staat(ensystem) und oekologisch Krise, Ph.D.-Thesis, Frankfurt/M., 1999, p. 131 - 142