2.   Resources and Constraints of Social Democratic Politics at the End of the 20 th Century

Theoretical concepts and political programs are not to be automatically transformed into policies. There are usually at least two filters standing between the principles, goals and policy proposals of a party's programme and its realisation (Elster 1979). These do not only influence the actual policy decisions (outputs) and policy results (outcomes), but are also frequently taken into consideration when strategies and programmes are designed. The first filter consists of both the resources available to a party for implementing its goals and the constraints restricting it: this can be called the structural filter of political action.

To a large extent this first filter structures the political arena and defines the corridors of action that are open to political actors. This can be viewed both objectively (confining conditions) and subjectively (perception, interpretation). The perception and assessment of this constraint and resource filter marks out the cognitive strategic horizons of political actors. Within these boundaries there is thus a limited number of options open to political actors. From among these options they make their choices in a second filtering process. This second filtering process is determined by filter 1 and the interaction of strategic and political interests. Normative considerations become often secondary. Beyond the structural constraints and normative considerations the political choices are particularly influenced by competition and cooperation among relevant political actors, particularly government, parties, organisations, business interests and the media. Whereas the first filter represents "structure", the second filter represents "choice".

Both filters determine the strategic and substantive contours of politics. The walls of this structural corridor of action (the so-called confining conditions) are, however, by no means immovable. This is because political decisions that are made and implemented affect the nature of the first filter, which in turn can narrow or widen the "corridor of action" for the subsequent choices. In this sense each government is the heir of the politics that has preceded it, whether it be a party's own or that of a political opponent. It is the varying weight of this legacy that plays a large and varying role in the opportunities open to social democratic parties at the turn of the century.

Which are the specific elements of the filters that impact on social democracy's search for "Third Ways" and the "New Centre"? The most significant of these will be outlined here, rather than discussed in detail.

2.1   Filter 1: Resources and Constraints Resources

The three most important resources for West European social democracies during the 1990s are:

- Social democratic parties' share of the vote in Europe: as an aggregate number this is no higher in the 1990s than in the post-war decades (see Table 1). But at the end of the decade there is a peak of social democratic votes remembering the golden years of the sixties and seventies (Merkel 1995).

- Governmental power: On average this is no higher in the 1990s in Europe than in the previous post-war decades. However, in 1999 it is at an historic level. The fact that social democratic parties are governing alone or are dominant coalition partners in 12 EU countries is not so much a trend, but more of an unprecedented coincidence. Whether this "historic moment of opportunity" consolidates into a medium-term trend depends partly on the credibility and success of the social democratic parties in key policy areas over the next years.

- Decline of conservative and neo-liberal parties in the 1990s: Of course this is also not an irreversible trend. Rather, it appears to be the temporary exhaustion of a political cycle of about two decades of neo-liberal politics, which social democratic parties and governments can exploit.

Opposing these resources, located largely in the political arena, are considerable economic and social constraints which restrict social democratic governance. The most important are:

- globalisation (especially of the financial markets);

- Europeanisation of product markets;

- independent European Central Bank with a monetarist statute;⁵

- high national indebtedness narrows the room to move, particularly in high-cost areas such as social policy;

- demographic shifts: the shift in the age pyramid of the society forces changes in old age pension and health policies for reasons of cost;

- heterogenisation of the social structure: the main target group for social democratic policies can no longer primarily be the shrinking male (industrial) workforce or employees;

- individualisation (values, lifestyle etc.) forces a pluralisation of policy content and a change in the hierarchical style of politics

- Compared to the "Golden Age" (1950-1973) the voters of social democratic parties are socio-structurally (primarily industrial workers) and socio-culturally (dense social democratic milieus) less strongly anchored in a core constituency. Rather, they have become more volatile. This means that social democratic parties have to take into consideration an electorate willing to switch allegiances between elections much more than was the case in the immediate post-war decades. The strategic-political boundaries thus become narrower and, despite normative assertions to the contrary, the choices of social democratic governments are more strongly influenced by tactical electoral considerations.⁶

Whereas these constraints - albeit with national variations - affect all social democratic governments, there are elements in the structural filter that cannot be classified as restrictions or resources a priori and independently of national political contexts. To this group belong:

- institutional structures of the political system: it makes a significant difference whether the political systems tend to resemble more centralist-majoritarian or more federal-consensus democracies (Lijphart 1984). In the first instance the government''s ability to access and organise the political agenda will be greater, more direct and quicker than can ever be the case in consensus democracies where governments are forced to negotiate and reach compromises.⁷

- coalition potential in the party system: single-party government (Greece, Great Britain): left-wing coalition (Germany, France, Italy, Sweden); centre-left coalition (Denmark, the Netherlands); grand coalition (Belgium, Finland, Austria: until January 2000);

- trade unions' strength and willingness to co-operate;

- business interests' strength and willingness to oppose or to cooperate;

- media: in the short-term the media allow themselves to be influenced by the modern PR work of people such as Mendelsohn (Labour Party) and Hombach (SPD). In the medium-term, however, their (independent) influence on politics is likely to be stronger than the other way around. This is especially the case in federal systems like Germany where state elections force the federal government continually to justify itself in the public arena shaped largely by the media;

- European Union: for the time being the EU is reducing national governments' powers. These powers can be regained only with difficulty through negotiation and compromise in the interconnected multi-level system of the EU (Scharpf 1999). However, given a corresponding willingness to reach compromise and consensus, new opportunities of policy making, which nation states had lost through the globalisation and Europeanisation of markets, could emerge in particular policy areas.

- politico-cultural traditions and values: content and style of governance are embedded in  national political cultures. Dominant societal values and political preferences in the individual countries (such as the stability of the currency in Germany, full employment in Sweden, high levels of welfare in Denmark or freedom with respect to work and leisure time in the Netherlands) can be influenced only in the medium- to long-term. In the short-term, however, they act as important independent contraints on policy formulation.

2.2   Filter 2: Options and Decisions

The second filter is not constituted by structures. Rather, the structures simply represent the "boundaries" of the political arena. However, within these borders there is a certain range of choices (strategic choices and policy choices as well) for the governments. If this were not the case it would in fact make no difference which party governs, something that is not just suspected often by voters, but which is contended from time to time by social science theorists, such as Luhmann (e.g. 1984), or empirical studies (Wilensky 1981). In a second filtering process the particular policy options from this "feasible set" are then transformed into binding decisions through parliamentary majorities and governments. These decisions are thus affected by:

- coalitions and alliances;

- perceptions and interpretations of the options;

- programmatic and policy goals of governments.

With respect to filter 1 all Western European social democratic parties currently face similar external constraints, whereas the internal restrictions and resources vary much more. Just as variable are the political decisions within the second filter. These variations in "actual policy" are primarily influenced by the differing national resources and constraints, the differing perceptions of the actors, and their contrasting programmatic goals. However, the list of constraints indicates that at the end of the 20th century the external restrictions have increased and the political room for manoeuvre, i.e. the "feasible set" of realistic options, has shrunk. Yet, if we look more closely at the programmes and policies of the governing social democrats, we can identify different styles and contents of social democratic governance, or, metaphorically speaking, different routes of the Third Ways that are leading social democracy into the 21st century.