Endnotes
1 The metaphor of the 'Third Way' is of course much older and
is by no means the exclusive preserve of
Europe's social democrats. It was not only used by the Austromarxists in the
1920s, by the Socialist International in 1951, by the Swedish social democrats
in 1990 and by the advisors to Bill Clinton, but was also used by the Italian
fascists to characterise a path between Bolshevik Communism and democratic
liberalism, as well as by Pope Pius XI to distinguish between collectivism and
unrestrained individualism.
2 Apart from structural defects and the conviction that it
erodes the work ethic, there are two other reasons for New Labour's view that reforms
are needed: first, because the 'old welfare state' burdens "national" business
in a global economy; and, second, because tax payers are less and less prepared
to pay for unproductive social transfers.
3 The critique that Giddens' emphasis on duties and
responsibility to society is directed not towards the rich and powerful (they
have done their duty), but towards welfare state dependents (Ehrke 1999: 20) is
thus polemic, wrong and untenable.
4
In Sweden this also functioned
only as long as a collective work and community ethic prevented the abuse of
welfare benefits by rational free-riders (above all in the 50s and 60s). The
reforms of the Swedish welfare state in the 1990s are aimed at eliminating the
increasing level of free riding without endangering the ideals, core and
substance of the welfare state.
5 For the Red-Green coalition in
Germany this is certainly not a heightened constraint, as the ECB may follow a
more relaxed monetary policy in the medium-term than the German Federal Bank.
However, for countries such as France, Italy and Finland there is in future
likely to be less scope for action.
6 This should not be understood as an
accusation or betrayal. It simply recognises the fact that the nature of politics
in democracies depends a lot on voter choice. However, if voters' party
loyalties have become weaker and individual voting decisions depend less and
less on the socio-structural and socio-cultural socialisation process, then
parties will adapt themselves much more to the changing voter preferences
(which are strongly influenced by the media) than to the long-term programmes
based on normative principles and rational structural considerations.
7 Lijphart classified Great Britain
(like most Anglosaxon democracies) and Switzerland close to the ideal-types for
majoritarian and consensus respectively. In the current social democratic
governments Great Britain and France tend more strongly towards a
"majoritarian" and hierarchical style of politics and decision-making, whereas
the Netherlands, and likewise Germany, (has to) tend more towards consensual
politics (see below).
8
I would like to thank my student
assistant Christian Henkes for his research, suggestions and criticism in this
chapter.'
9
Even after a year in office no
comparably clear profile can be identified in the red-green governing coalition
in Germany. Constrained by an institutional set up that forces compromise, the
New Centre is in many respects still moving along the 'centre path' (Schmidt
1990) that has consistently shaped the policies of federal governments in recent
decades.
10 Despite its obvious importance,
monetary policy is not taken into consideration, because, with the exception of
Great Britain and Sweden, it is determined by the European Central Bank for all
countries under study.
11
The consideration of the strengths
and weaknesses is based on an elaborated version in the positioning paper
'Dritte Wege - Neue Mitte' by the 'Grundwertekommission beim Parteivorstand der
SPD', for which I am responsible.
12
Nonetheless, on its first day in
office the Blair Government gave the reserve bank responsibility for making
operating decisions about interest rate settings.
13
Nevertheless, the number of those
living below the poverty line in spite of earning a working wage is considerably
higher in Great Britain than in most countries in the European Community.
14
The rate of female participation
also continues to lag noticeably behind the European average.
15
All figures are from the OECD
Employment Outlook June 1999.
16
With the education and training
offensive the new Labour Government also made an effort to close the productivity
gap existing between it and the EMU countries.
17
It was always one of the most
important strategic arguments in favour of the unversalist welfare state in Sweden
that as many people as possible should benefit from it so that it would also be
in their own interests to retain it (see, for example, Esping-Andersen 1985).
18
In Great Britain the reforms were
mostly implemented by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major and
simply accepted by the Blair Government. The Blair Government's reform policies
were therefore able to build on a much more deregulated economic and social
system than the Dutch social democrats were able to do post-1989.
19
The positive employment record thus
began well before the social democrats returned to power (1989), but was extraordinarily
successfully continued by them.
20
The price of this, however, was
productivity growth slower than the OECD average (as in the USA) (Visser/Hemerijk
1998: 45).
21
This more just distribution relates
both generally to insiders' and outsiders' opportunities for participation in
the labour market and, specifically, to the gender-specific distribution of
jobs.
22
The even more comprehensively
developed Swedish welfare state rests more strongly on the principles of
universalism and financing through taxation and is therefore considered as part
of another welfare state category (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmidt 1998).
23
At the
beginning of the 1980s Sweden had the smallest level of after-tax income
equality in the entire OECD (Merkel 1993: 168).
24
Since 1997
Norway (75.6%) has replaced Sweden (74.5%) as the OECD country with the highest
rate of female employment. In 1997 Germany had a female employment rate of
61.4% (OECD Employment Outlook June 1998: 193).
25
Measured
against the import/export share of GDP this was already the case even at the peak
of the ¡®Swedish model¡¯ in the 70s.
26
The participation rates in Sweden
remain among the highest in the European Union, although they have in the
meantime been overtaken by Denmark and Great Britain.
27
See Maravall 1997 for discussion of
the development of the Spanish labour market.
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