Abstract


 

Strategy of Trade Union Intervention
in Restructuring Process

 

Korean Confederation of Trade Unions

 

The need for and the types of strategy of intervention 

  • Trade union intervention is needed to obtain employment security, non-reformist reform, organisational consolidation
  • the strong society-wide perception that the inefficiency and immoral practices of the chaebol system were the causes of the economic crisis provides advantageous opportunities to promote active intervention strategy
  • strategy of intervention can be directed at three levels: intervention in ownership structure, intervention in supra-enterprise level policy formulation, enterprise level participation in management 
  1. Intervention in Ownership Structure 
  • Intervention in ownership structure is aimed at consolidating public ownership within the broader ownership structure or to restrict the ownership by private capital. There are three forms of this intervention strategy:
  • Creation of a separate fund, such as wage-earners fund, to promote the working class as the centre of collective ownership
  • Utilising the existing pension and funds to promote social ownership and at the same time limiting the private ownership of capitalists
  • Transforming the ?employee shareholders programmes? so that trade union organisations can exercise the ownership rights of individual workers in a collective manner 
  • Wage-earners fund
  • fund is created by contribution from a part of corporate profit and is managed by an executive body where trade union representatives make up the majority
  • democratic transition of system orientation, restriction on wealth concentration, industrial policy effect, promotion of industrial democracy can be expected as key results
  • would be difficult to introduce in short term due to considerable social resistance; but successful cases of ?employee buyout firms? can lead to the creation of better social receptiveness 
  • Reform the pension system
  • the appointment system can be reformed so that trade union representatives can dominate the executive bodies of pension funds; investment of the pension fund in corporate shares can lead to greater influence
  • expansion of social ownership, consolidation of control on capitalist ownership, industrial and employment policy effects can be expected as key results
  • currently there is widespread perception of the inefficiency and non-economic performance of the four major social insurances, including the National Pension Scheme fueling changes in the institutional arrangement; it would not be difficult to influence the course of change to be advantageous to workers 
  • Reform of the ?employee shareholder programmes?
  • Needs a special law addressing the needs of employee shareholder programmes; should pave the way for financial support for ?employee shareholder programmes? by the government and financial institutions
  • Create a two-tiered ?employee shareholder programme?: one at the level of individual enterprises and the other a national programme which can have a similar effect as ?wage-earners fund?; trade unions can utilise their control in ?employee shareholder programmes? as a vehicle for management participation
  • The current government initiated effort to introduce ESOP needs to be prevented; and it would not be difficult to introduce necessary laws and democratisation of the management of current ?employee shareholder programmes; centralised management of the funds of the enterprise level ?employee shareholder programmes? and strike funds can enable the national trade union organisation to create new central fund 
  1. Supra-Enterprise Level Policy Intervention 
  • There are three courses for intervention in economic and industrial policies at supra-enterprise level
  • they are: intervention through state agencies, intervention through tripartite consultation, and intervention through collective bargaining (between labour and employers)
  • intervention at an enterprise level cannot be free from the concern about competition amongst companies; this leads to a greater need for supra-enterprise level intervention
  • the results of intervention following the start of restructuring process cannot produce anything more than a partial change or compensation for ?damages?; therefore, there is a need to establish prior intervention to check on over-investment or inefficient investment which could prevent the greater future damage to both the labour and management 
  • Intervention through state policy formulation process and state agencies
  • intervention through financial institutions: intervention in the evaluation of management performance of specific companies, intervention as an institutional investor with a capacity to invest or withdraw from specific industries or enterprises, ?discrimination? in the lending policies and conditions according to specific industries and enterprises ? these are the forms of intervention which can lead to the creation of an effective influence on employment policies and investment decisions at industry and enterprise levels. This requires the participation of trade union representatives in financial institutions and financial supervisory agencies
  • investment fund system: intervention to develop capital formation through absorption of extra profit of companies can encourage the dilution income inequality, expansion reinvestment, and promotion of productive investment and employment-creating investment
  • intervention for employment security: aimed at establishing legal and institutional mechanisms for the consolidation of social safety net, for union-management consultation and agreement on employment adjustment, and for compulsory minimum compensation for laid-off workers and employment and staff development plan 
  • Intervention through tripartite consultation
  • what trade unions can aim to achieve through tripartite process is an employment alliance to promote economic growth and employment security
  • an agreement between labour and employers will require mutual concessions. This can be made easier by government compensation. Therefore, tripartite consultation can be advantageous compared to direct labour-employer consultation or negotiation
  • specific industry level or regional level tripartite consultation can promote regional industrial development and job creation, and trade unions can contribute to the establishment a network to assist small-to-medium enterprises which lack technological and financial resources 
  • Intervention through direct labour-employer collective bargaining
  • introduction of solidaristic wage system can apply pressure on inefficient sectors and expansion of reinvestment in the high-efficiency sectors leading to employment creation. This can lead to an effective industrial restructuring where labour force is transferred from inefficient sectors to efficient sectors. This can also restrict the widening of wage difference amongst workers; this can aid the preparation of the ground for the establishment of industrial unions
  • work-sharing through working hour reduction, limit on overtime work, and establishment of employment adjustment fund system can be obtained through collective bargaining. This can lead to pro-labour industrial restructuring 
  1. Participation in management at enterprise level 
  • Strategic participation in decision making process by a union enables prior intervention
  • can introduce pro-labour orientation and elements in structural adjustment including employment adjustment
  • there are two types in enterprise level management participation: one is appointment of worker representative in the board of directors, while the other is a system of co-determination 
  • Introduce a system of appointing worker representatives as members of board of directors and/or board of auditors
  • worker representative in board of directors can provide a secure source of important information
  • the introduction of German style separation of supervisory board and executive board would allow constant supervision of executive board and the exercise of a check and control on the unilateral power of chaebol owners. But this requires an in-depth examination of relevant laws and legal system for necessary amendments
  • an easier option is the appointment of worker representatives as members of board of directors or auditors. Already a system of appointment of trade union recommended outside company directors and auditors is introduced. However, this is a lower form compared to worker representative board member 
  • Two models of co-determination: Swedish model and German model. But, resistance against the German system would be weaker, therefore easier to pursue
  • There is a need to establish the key issues related to labour condition as matters requiring agreement and other management related issues as matters requiring consultation. Wide ranging issues and interest should be made subject to information disclosure. Types of information can be classified into two: one where there is unlimited right for access to the information, and those which are subject to application or claim for information disclosure.
  • Institutional mechanisms must be introduced to strengthen the binding force of the labour-management consultative councils: increase monetary penalty for violation or failure to comply, introduce scaled-up penalties, including business suspension orders for accumulation of violations or failures to comply. There should be a clear stipulation that decisions reached at labour-management consultative councils have the same binding force as collective agreements 
  • The need to promote a Swedish model of expansion and consolidation of the power and jurisdiction of collective agreement as a long term task
  • all issues and concerns related to labour (working) conditions and labour relations must be defined and established as legitimate subject matters for collective agreement so that matters of management and personnel decision can be included in collective agreements
  • conflict and tension can arise from strengthening of labour-management consultative councils and strengthening of collective agreement. Therefore, it would be necessary to maintain the current stipulation that collective bargaining and other activities of trade unions are not affected by the various legal provisions about labour-management consultative councils
  • it is necessary to stipulate that collective agreements have legally binding force and that the first right of interpretation of the agreement lies with workers representatives who are the weaker party in the labour market 
  1. Method of pursuing the various intervention strategies 
  • Intervention by trade unions is not a panacea, and therefore should be taken up with care and caution
  • intervention by trade unions must be undertaken on the basis of organisational strength and dominance at the shopfloor level. This requires a consolidation of vertical and horizontal integration within the national organisation
  • there is a need to identify and clarify the philosophic objective and concrete strategy of the movement and organisation to minimise internal confusion and conflict
  • it is impossible to avoid responsibility concomitant with intervention; internal democracy and a system of small discussion and decision making groups in the rank and file level must be consolidated to overcome individual or collective egoism within the ranks of workers
  • must establish principles and guidelines of intervention at industry level and system of support and regulation of enterprise level intervention to prevent the dangers of co-optation accompanying intervention
  • Consolidate education to develop and cultivate special and professional capacity and develop a mechanism for mobilising the support and participation of outside specialists
  • Consolidate education and publicity work to overcome rank and file disinterest in management participation
  • Develop various arguments and persuasive capacity to mobilise members and a wider societal understanding and support; need to develop a pro-active publicisation of cases of success
  • In an absence of institutional mechanism of participation, it is necessary to disempower the unilateral drive of management through non-cooperation and resistance at the shopfloor level to enforce a habit of prior consultation with trade union